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ABSTRACT
We develop a model of gross job and worker ﬂows and use it to study how the wages, permanent
incomes, and employment status of individual workers evolve over time. Our model helps explain
various features of labor markets, such as the amount of worker turnover in excess of job reallocation,
the length of job tenures and unemployment duration, and the size and persistence of the changes
in income that workers experience due to displacements or job-to-job transitions. We also examine
the eﬀects that labor market institutions and public policy have on the gross ﬂows, as well as on
the resulting wage distribution and employment in the equilibrium. From a theoretical standpoint,
we propose a notion of competitive equilibrium for random matching environments, and study the
extent to which it achieves an eﬃcient allocation of resources.
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Recent empirical and theoretical studies on gross job and worker ﬂows have changed the way
we think about the labor market. We now know that market economies exhibit high rates of
reallocation of employment across establishments as well as high rates of worker turnover from
one job to another and between employment and unemployment. We now view the number of
employed or unemployed workers as resulting from a large and continual reallocation process,
and we analyze how changes in the economic environment aﬀect this process. The study of
the gross ﬂows provides valuable insights into how the labor market carries out this continual
reallocation of resources, and at the same time raises many interesting questions: To what
extent are market economies able to perform this reallocation process eﬃciently? How is this
process aﬀected by labor market policies?
The empirical literature distinguishes between measures of job ﬂows and worker ﬂows. In a
series of inﬂuential studies using U.S. manufacturing census data, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992,
1999) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) measure gross job creation (JCt)a st h es u m
of employment gains over all plants that expand or start up between dates t−1 and t;g r o s sjob
destruction (JDt) as the sum of employment losses over all plants that contract or shut down;
and gross job reallocation as the sum of gross job creation and destruction (JRt = JCt +JDt).
By showing that gross job creation and destruction are both large irrespective of whether
aggregate employment grows or declines, their work highlights the role of heterogeneous forces
that cause employment to expand in some plants and contract in others. Behind these large
job ﬂows, however, are even larger worker ﬂows.
Estimates of worker ﬂows are based on establishment or on worker surveys, and measure
the movements of workers across establishments and labor-market states. Empirical studies
that draw on establishment data often deﬁne worker turnover at establishment i (WTit)a st h e
sum of the number of accessions (new hires) and separations (quits and displacements) between
dates t − 1 and t, and aggregate worker turnover (WTt) as the sum of worker turnover overestablishments.
Alternatively, empirical studies that draw on worker surveys to estimate worker ﬂows often
deﬁne worker reallocation (WRt) as the number of workers who change employment states (i.e.,
who change place of employment, ﬁnd or lose a job, or enter or exit the labor force) between
dates t − 1 and t. Worker turnover measures the number of labor market transitions, while
worker reallocation counts the number of workers who participate in transitions. A worker who
moves from one establishment to another increases the worker reallocation count by one and
the aggregate worker turnover count by two; hence, aggregate worker turnover is larger than
worker reallocation by the number of job-to-job transitions.1
Empirically, worker turnover is signiﬁcantly larger than job reallocation. Drawing from
diﬀerent data sources for job and worker ﬂows, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) estimate that job
creation and job destruction account for no less than one-third and no more than one-half of
quarterly worker turnover in the U.S. manufacturing sector. New evidence from data sets that
incorporate information on the number of accessions and separations at the establishment level
indicates that for most establishments, for most of the time, worker turnover is much larger than
job reallocation. Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000), for example, refer to the diﬀerence between
worker turnover and the net employment change as “churning” (Cit = WTit − |eit − eit−1|,
where eit is employment in establishment i at the end of period t). This notion of churning
measures the number of worker transitions in excess of the minimum needed to achieve the
actual change in employment. Summing over establishments delivers an aggregate measure of
churning: Ct = WTt − JRt. They use quarterly data from all private sector establishments in
the state of Maryland and ﬁnd that churning ﬂows account for 70% of worker turnover in non-
manufacturing and about 62% in manufacturing (job reallocation accounts for the rest).2 From
1This is the case provided both the worker-side and establishment-side data sets cover the entire economy,
and provided no accessions or separations are reversed within the sample period; else WT t − WR t would be an
upper bound for the number of job-to-job transitions.
2Similarly, based on data derived from the unemployment insurance systems of eight U.S. states, Anderson
and Meyer (1994) report that gross job reallocation accounts for only 24% of quarterly worker turnover in
manufacturing. Drawing from a data set covering the universe of Danish manufacturing plants, Albæk and
Sørensen (1998) report a ratio of quarterly job reallocation to worker turnover of .42 and ﬁnd that replacement
2an aggregate perspective, the amount of worker turnover in excess of job reallocation depends
not only on the amount of simultaneous hiring and ﬁring that takes place at the establishment
level (e.g., as measured by Cit), but also on the extent to which job-to-job transitions are a
common mechanism through which the market achieves the reallocation of workers. In this
respect, recent studies ﬁnd that job-to-job ﬂows are also large: Fallick and Fleischman (2001)
estimate that in the United States in 1999, on average 4 million workers changed employers
from one month to the next (about 2.7% of employment), more than twice the number who
transited from employment to unemployment. The fact that worker ﬂows exceed job ﬂows at
the establishment level is evidence of heterogeneity at the level of the employer-worker match–a
layer of heterogeneity over and above the cross-establishment heterogeneity that can be inferred
from the sheer size of the job ﬂows alone.
The image that emerges is that of a labor market continuously reallocating employment
positions across establishments (job reallocation), and workers across existing employment po-
sitions (worker turnover). This grand reallocation process often does not force workers to go
through unemployment in order to switch employers, and does not require employment posi-
tions to become vacant in order to replace a worker. To us, all this suggests that in order to
fully understand the workings of the labor market, we need to pry into the nature of job ﬂows,
worker ﬂows, job-to-job transitions, and replacement hiring.
To this end, in this paper we develop a canonical equilibrium search model that incorporates
job-to-job transitions, exhibits instances of replacement hiring, and conceptually distinguishes
hiring (deﬁned as the sum of accessions minus job creation) is on average 16.5% of manufacturing employment.
They also report interesting cross-establishment observations–for example, that 62% of all separations are
accounted for by plants with employment growth rates in the interval (−0.3,0.1] and that plants with employment
growth rates in the interval (−0.1,0.3] account for 56% of all hires. (Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000) also
present some establishment-level cross-sectional evidence, such as that most of the employers in their data set
have churning rates above 50%. See their Figure 1 on page 483, which reports the distribution of Cit/WTit.)
Hamermesh, Hassink and van Ours (1996) ﬁnd that job reallocation accounts for only one-third of worker turnover
in a random sample of establishments in the Netherlands. They also ﬁnd that most mobility is into and out of
existing positions, not to new or from destroyed ones; that a large fraction of all hires (separations) take place
at ﬁrms where employment is declining (expanding); and that simultaneous hiring is mostly due to unobservable
heterogeneity in the workforce.
3b e t w e e ng r o s sj o ba n dw o r k e rﬂows.3 A situation that arises naturally whenever agents can
continue to search while matched, is one in which a matched agent contacts a new potential
partner (who may also be matched) and each must decide whether to form a new match with
the new partner or to stay with the old one. In a labor-market context, the employer who is
trying to recruit an employed worker may have to face competition from the worker’s current
employer, and in addition, the recruiting employer’s current employee may attempt to discour-
age this employer from replacing him with the new worker (e.g., by accepting a smaller share
of the matching surplus). Natural as they may seem, these generic situations have not been
systematically analyzed in the literature.4 One of the building blocks of our theory–and one of
the contributions of this paper–is a simple and ﬂexible noncooperative bargaining procedure
that allows for competition among all parties taking part in such meetings. The equilibrium
of the bargaining game we propose delivers the division of the gains from matching as well as
privately eﬃcient creation and destruction of matches.
O u rs e c o n dg o a li nt h i sp a p e r ,i na d d i t i o nt od e v e l o p i n gam o d e lo fj o ba n dw o r k e rt u r n o v e r ,
is to use the theory to explain various features of labor markets. For example, what determines
the amount of worker turnover in excess of job reallocation? Why is it that worker turnover in
Europe is substantially smaller than in the United States, whereas–despite the diﬀerences in
labor-market policy regimes–job reallocation is roughly the same?5 Why do displaced workers
tend to experience a signiﬁcant and persistent fall in incomes? Why do workers stay unemployed
when on-the-job search is at least as eﬀective as oﬀ-the-job search? Why are good jobs not only
better paid, but often also more stable? In order to answer these questions we examine how
3Job and worker reallocation are one and the same by construction in the workhorse of much of the recent
macro-labor literature, the matching model of Diamond (1982b), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) or Pissarides
(2000). And there is no room for replacement hiring in the inﬂuential on-the-job search model of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998).
4The ﬁrst generation of job-search models assumed that agents could only search while unmatched, e.g., see
Lippman and McCall (1976). However, Blau and Robins (1990) ﬁnd that job-search while employed is no less
eﬀective than while unemployed. In Section 7, we explain how our work ﬁts within the existing search literature
that allows search while matched.
5This fact is documented in Bertola and Rogerson (1997), Blanchard and Portugal (2001), and Pries and
Rogerson (2005).
4the employment status and wages of individual workers evolve over time, as well as the eﬀects
that labor market institutions and public policy have on the gross job and worker ﬂows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the environment and
characterizes the eﬃcient allocations. Section 3 introduces the notion of competitive matching
equilibrium and characterizes its salient features. Section 4 incorporates employment protection
policies, and Section 5 extends the model to allow for free entry of employers. For a special case,
Section 6 provides a fuller characterization of the equilibrium set, discusses the main properties
of the allocations, derives several labor-market implications, and shows how the model can
help to rationalize many of the properties of job and worker ﬂows documented in the empirical
literature. Section 7 discusses the related literature. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix
contains all proofs and explains some properties of the bargaining procedure we propose.
2T h e M o d e l
Time is continuous and the horizon is inﬁnite. The economy is populated by a continuum of
ﬁxed and equal numbers of employers and workers. We normalize the size of each population to
unity. Employers and workers are inﬁnitely-lived and risk-neutral. They discount future utility
at rate r>0,a n da r eex ante homogeneous in tastes and technology. (Although our main
interest here is in the labor market, our model is applicable to any other setting where bilateral
partnerships are relevant, such as the interactions between spouses, or between a tenant and a
landlord, or between a supplier and the buyer of a customized product.)
A worker meets a randomly chosen employer according to a Poisson process with arrival
rate α.A ne m p l o y e rm e e t sar a n d o mw o r k e ra c c o r d i n gt ot h es a m ep r o c e s s . 6 Upon meeting,
the employer-worker pair randomly draws a production opportunity of productivity y,w h i c h
represents the ﬂow net output each agent will produce while matched. (Thus the pair produces
6In general we can think of the total meeting rate as being equal to α·(population of employers)·(population
of workers). Here, because the populations of employers and workers are both unity, the rate at which a worker
meets a randomly chosen employer equals the rate at which an employer meets a randomly chosen worker, and
both equal α, the total meeting rate. In this basic setup, employers and workers are completely symmetric.
Below we analyze extensions where they diﬀer in a variety of ways.
52y.) The random variable y takes one of N distinct values: y1,y 2,...,y N, where 0 <y 1 <y 2 <
...<y N,a n dy = yi with probability πi for i =1 ,...,N,a n d
PN
i=1 πi =1 . The realization of
the random variable y that an employer and a worker draw when they ﬁr s tm e e ti so b s e r v e d
without delay. We assume y remains constant for the duration of the match.
Matched and unmatched agents meet potential partners at the same rate, so when an
employer and a worker meet and draw a productive opportunity, each of them may or may
not already be matched with an old production partner. Each agent can be in, at most, one
productive partnership at any given time. The productivity of the new potential match as well
as the productivities of the existing matches are public information to all the agents involved,
i.e., the worker and the employer who draw the new productivity and their existing partners, if
they have any. On the other hand, each agent’s history is private information, except for what
is revealed by the current production match.
When an employer and a worker draw a new production opportunity, the pair and their old
partners (if they have any) determine whether or not the new match is formed (and consequently
whether or not the existing matches are destroyed) as well as the once-and-for-all side payments
that each party pays or receives, following a bargaining protocol which we will describe shortly.
Utility is assumed to be transferable among all the agents involved in a meeting. There is no
outside court to enforce any formal contract, so any eﬀective contract must be self-enforcing
among the parties involved. If the parties who made contact decide to form a new partnership,
they leave their existing partners, who then become unmatched. In addition to these endogenous
separations, we assume any match is subject to exogenous separation according to a Poisson
process with arrival rate δ.
We use nit to denote the measure of matches of productivity yi and n0t to denote the
measure of unmatched employers or workers at date t.L e tτk
ijt be the probability that a worker
with current productivity yi and an employer with current productivity yj form a new match
of productivity yk, given that they draw an opportunity to produce yk at time t. (Hereafter,
we will suppress the time subindex when no confusion arises.) The measure of workers in each
6state evolves according to:
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The ﬁrst term on the right side of (1) is the ﬂow of new matches of productivity yi created by all
types of workers and employers. The second term is the total ﬂow of matches with productivity
yi destroyed endogenously when the worker or the employer leaves to form a new match. The
last term is the ﬂow of matches dissolved exogenously. On the right side of equation (2), the
ﬁrst term is the ﬂow of workers who become unmatched when their employers decide to break
the current match to form a new match with another worker. The second term is the ﬂow of
workers who become unmatched due to the exogenous dissolution of matches. The third term
is the ﬂow of new matches created by employers and unemployed workers.
Before describing the competitive matching equilibrium with bargaining, we solve the so-
cial planner’s problem. The planner chooses τk






subject to the ﬂow constraints (1) and (2), and initial conditions for n0 and ni for i =1 ,...,N.















ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj).






=1 if λk + λ0 >λ i + λj
∈ [0,1] if λk + λ0 = λi + λj
=0 if λk + λ0 <λ i + λj,
(3)
7together with the Euler equations
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and (1) and (2). According to (3), to achieve the optimal allocation, the planner speciﬁes that
at y p ei worker and type j employer should form a new match of productivity yk for sure if and
only if the sum of the shadow prices of the new match and the unmatched worker and employee
(which the new match would generate) exceeds the sum of the shadow prices of the existing
matches of productivity yi and yj. From (3) we also learn that τk
ij = τk
ji, except possibly for
the case of randomized strategies. Intuitively, there is no inherent asymmetry between a worker
and an employer, so the planner treats them symmetrically in the optimal allocation. These
observations allow us to summarize the ﬁrst order necessary conditions as:









ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj) (4)









0j (λk − λj). (5)
Equation (4) says that in the planner’s problem, the ﬂow return of a match of productivity yi
equals the capital gain associated with the change of the shadow price plus the sum of the three
terms on the right side: the ﬂow output generated by the match, minus the expected loss from
an exogenous separation, plus the expected gain from the endogenous creation and destruction
of matches that occur when either of the agents in the match of productivity i meets an agent
in a match of productivity j (which occurs at rate 2αnj) and draws productivity yk (with
probability πk). The ﬂow return of a pair of unmatched agents in (5) is similar but output is
zero and there is no loss resulting from exogenous separation.
83 Competitive Matching Equilibrium
In a decentralized economy, the creation and destruction of matches depends on how the gains
from trade are divided among the agents who ﬁnd a new production opportunity and their
old partners (if they have any). In this section we propose a notion of equilibrium where the
prevailing matches are determined, and the gains from trade are apportioned, through the
following bargaining procedure.
When a worker and an employer ﬁnd a new production opportunity, a move by Nature
ﬁrst determines, with equal probability, whether the worker(s) or the employer(s) have the
bargaining power. The agents with the new production opportunity then choose whether to
bargain ﬁrst with the new potential partner or with the old partner, if there is one.7 All
negotiations are bilateral, either between new potential partners or between old partners. Once
the bargaining pairs have been decided, the agent with the bargaining power makes an oﬀer
which consists of a proposal to produce together and a division of surplus to be implemented
through spot side payments. The recipient of the oﬀer chooses whether to accept, reject, or
continue to negotiate with the alternative partner (if there is one), withholding the received
oﬀer as her outside option. An outstanding oﬀer is public information, and cannot be revised
later. If the oﬀer is rejected, then the agent who has an alternative partner will negotiate
without the outside option.
The second round of bilateral bargaining, with or without outside option(s), is similar to
the ﬁrst round: The agent with the bargaining power makes an oﬀer, and the recipient either
accepts or rejects it. If an oﬀer is rejected, the recipient then makes a ﬁnal choice of whether to
accept or reject the withheld oﬀer (if she has one). The bargaining ends either when an oﬀer
is accepted, or when there is no alternative partner to bargain with after rejection (in which
case there will be no match for production). The bargaining does not take time: the entire
7If one of the agents with the option to form a new match chooses to bargain with her old partner ﬁrst, while
the other one chooses to bargain with his new partner ﬁrst, then the latter will wait until the former comes to
b a r g a i nw i t hh i m .
9process ﬁnishes instantaneously. We specify that as long as neither encounters a new production
opportunity, matched agents split output equally.8 There is no outside court to enforce formal
contracts, so agents can walk away from a match at any time without penalty. (In Section 4 we
introduce a government that imposes a tax on every employer who separates from a worker.)
A competitive matching equilibrium is a set of bargaining strategies specifying a sequencing
of bargaining partners, how much utility to oﬀer bargaining partners in order to produce to-
gether, and whether to accept, reject, or withhold a received oﬀer, together with a population
distribution of partnerships such that: (a) taking the population distribution and the bargain-
ing strategies of the other agents as given, each agent chooses her bargaining strategies in order
to maximize her expected discounted utility; and (b) given the agents’ bargaining strategies,
the population distribution satisﬁes (1) and (2).
Three diﬀerent types of meetings can result from the random matching process: (i) a meeting
between an unmatched worker and an unmatched employer, (ii) a meeting between a matched
agent and an unmatched agent, or (iii) a meeting between a matched worker and a matched
employer. Since creating a new match entails destroying one existing match in situation (ii)
and two existing matches in situation (iii), we follow Diamond and Maskin (1979), and refer to
the former as a “single breach” and to the latter as a “double breach.” Since a worker and an
employer who form a match are inherently symmetric, we will restrict attention to equilibria in
which workers and employers are treated symmetrically and agents are distinguished only by
the productivity of their current match. We will refer to a match of productivity yi as a “type
i m a t c h , ”a n dc a l law o r k e ro ra ne m p l o y e ri nat y p ei match a “type i agent.” Let Vi be the
value of expected discounted utility of a type i agent, and let V0 be the value of an unmatched
agent. We begin by describing the bargaining outcomes for each of the three types of meetings,
taking Vi and V0 as given. We will then specify how these values are determined in equilibrium.
8Equivalently, we can think of the matched pair without an outside production opportunity as being involved
in continual negotiations by which the expected value of side payments nets out to be zero. (See the proof of
Proposition 3 for more on this.)
10(i). An unmatched worker and an unmatched employer draw an opportunity.
Suppose that an unemployed worker and an employer with a vacancy draw an opportunity
for each to produce yk. Since both are unmatched, the outside option to each agent is V0.T h i s
case is illustrated in Figure 1, where we have named the two agents involved in this meeting A
and B.L e tXk
ij be the value that agent i oﬀers agent j in order to form (or preserve) a match
of productivity yk.S p e c i ﬁcally, Xk
ij includes the value of the match plus the net side payment
agent i pays to agent j. The bargaining unfolds as follows. With probability a half, A makes
a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer Xk
AB to B. Clearly, A will choose this oﬀer in order to maximize her
own utility, subject to the constraint that B will accept. Hence, A oﬀers Xk
AB = V0,a n dB
accepts. With the same probability, B makes an oﬀer Xk
BA = V0 to A, which is again accepted.
Figure 1: An unmatched employer meets an unmatched worker.
Let Πi be the expected payoﬀ to agent i and Γi be her expected gain. Then, ΠA = ΠB =
1
2V0 + 1
2(2Vk − V0)=Vk,a n dΓA = ΓB = Vk − V0. In this symmetric situation the expected
value of the side payment is zero, and both unmatched agents enjoy the same expected capital
gains from forming the new match.
(ii). A matched agent and an unmatched agent draw an opportunity.
Suppose that worker B, who is currently in a match of productivity yi with employer A,
11meets employer C, who has vacancy, and they draw a productive opportunity yk. This situation
is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Single breach.
We consider two cases.
Case 1: Vk >V i. Depending upon Nature’s draw, with equal probability, either worker B
has bargaining power, or employers A and C have bargaining power. When worker B has
bargaining power, B proposes the new partner C to match, oﬀering Xk
BC = V0.E m p l o y e r C
a c c e p t st h i so ﬀer, and B appropriates all the surplus from the new match, 2Vk − V0.W h e n
instead employers A and C have bargaining power, because the new potential match has higher
value than the existing one, B chooses to bargain with the new employer, C, ﬁrst. When
choosing Xk
CB,t h en e we m p l o y e rk e e p si nm i n dt h a tB can continue to bargain with his old
employer (A)w i t hXk
CB as his outside option: the old employer (A) will outbid C as long as
paying Xk
CB to continue matching with B is better than becoming unmatched, i.e., as long as
2Vi − Xk
CB >V 0.S o i n o r d e r f o r C to win B over A, C’s oﬀer has to be at least as large
as 2Vi − V0, therefore Xk
CB =2 Vi − V0 and A cannot outbid C.( I f A was to oﬀer B more
than 2Vi − V0, her value of continuing matching with B would be less than the value of being
12unmatched.) Notice that regardless of which agent(s) have the bargaining power, B’s payoﬀ
from matching with C will be larger than 2Vi − V0, the maximum he can get from matching
with A. Thus, in the equilibrium, B and C create the new match while A becomes unmatched.
The expected gains are:








[V0 +( 2 Vk − 2Vi + V0)] − V0 = Vk − Vi.
Note that through the side payment of transferable utility, the expected gains to the agents
who form the new match are equal to the capital gains of the new partner instead of their own
capital gains: the gain to B is Vk − V0 and the gain to C is Vk −Vi,s oB, who is in a stronger
bargaining position, enjoys a larger gain than C. On the other hand, A suﬀers a capital loss
from becoming unmatched without receiving any compensation (there is no reason for the new
pair to pay A since B can walk away without any penalty).9
Case 2: Vi >V k. Again, depending upon Nature’s draw and with equal probability, either
worker B has bargaining power, or employers A and C have bargaining power. When B has
bargaining power, he makes an oﬀer Xi
BA = V0 to A,w h i c hi sa c c e p t e d ,a n dB monopolizes
all the surplus, 2Vi − V0. When the employers A and C have bargaining power, B chooses to
b a r g a i nw i t hh i so l de m p l o y e r ,A, ﬁrst, since the old match is better than the new match. The
o l de m p l o y e rm a k e sa no ﬀer Xi
AB to B, who can continue to bargain with C holding Xi
AB as
9We derived the equilibrium gains under the presumption that B will bargain with “the winner” (in this case
C) ﬁrst, both when B has bargaining power and when A and C do. Suppose that A and C have bargaining power,
and that B instead chooses to bargain with A ﬁrst. Since A knows she will lose (because the maximum payoﬀ
she is willing to oﬀer B is 2Vi − V0 while C can bid up to 2Vk − V0), A is indiﬀerent between making any oﬀer
X
i
AB such that X
i
AB ≤ 2Vi − V0.I np a r t i c u l a r ,s h em a ym a k ea“ l o u s y ”o ﬀer to B, X
i
AB < 2Vi − V0.I fA does
this, then B will ﬁnd himself in a weak bargaining position when he goes on to negotiate with C.T h u sB will not
gain from negotiating ﬁrst with the loser, A,b e c a u s et h em o s tB can receive from A is X
i
AB =2 Vi − V0,w h i c h
is the minimum payoﬀ B can get from negotiating ﬁrst with the winner, C. The upshot is that in every case,
the equilibrium outcomes (match creation and destruction decisions and expected payoﬀs) are always uniquely
determined, and are those which are induced by the equilibrium in which B always chooses to bargain with the
“winner” ﬁrst.
13an outside option. When choosing Xi
AB, A takes into account that the new employer, C,w i l l
outbid Xi
AB if and only if paying Xi
AB in order to form the new match with B is better than
remaining unmatched, i.e., if 2Vk−Xi
AB >V 0. Thus, in order for A to win B over C, A chooses
to pay Xi
AB =2 Vk−V0. Regardless of which side has bargaining power, B’s payoﬀ from staying
with A is larger than the payoﬀ he can get by matching with C. Therefore, A and B remain








[(2Vi − V0)+( 2 Vk − V0)] − Vi = Vk − V0,
ΓC = V0 − V0 =0 .
Although the current match is not destroyed, the old partner, A, has to buy out B’s expected
gains from matching with C (by making a utility side payment with expected value equal to
Vk − V0) in order to persuade B to stay in the current match.10
When we compare the sum of expected payoﬀs of all agents, we have ΠA+ΠB+ΠC = V0+2Vk
when the new match is formed, and ΠA + ΠB + ΠC =2 Vi + V0 when the old match continues.
In both cases, Vk >V i and Vi >V k, the match with higher value prevails in the equilibrium.
Here, with fully transferable utility, the Coase Theorem holds: the total sum of payoﬀso fa l lt h e
agents involved in the meeting is maximized under the bargaining procedure of our competitive
matching equilibrium, for given values of Vjs. T h eC o a s eT h e o r e mc o n t i n u e st oh o l di nt h e
case of double breach, to which we turn next.
(iii). A matched worker and a matched employer draw an opportunity.
Suppose that worker B and employer C meet and draw a productive opportunity yk.T h e
situation now is that B is currently in a match of productivity yi with employer A,w h i l eC is
currently in a match of productivity yj with worker D. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
10In the above analysis, we have assumed that the matched agent with the outside opportunity to form a
new match is a worker; i.e., B was a worker, and A and C employers. But because workers and employers are
symmetric, the gains from the trade will be the same if instead, A and C are workers and B is an employer.
14Figure 3: Double breach.
Case 1: Vk+V0 >V i+Vj. B e c a u s et h es u mo ft h ev a l u e so ft h en e wm a t c ha n dt h eu n m a t c h e d
exceeds the sum of the values of the old matches, the agent who does not have bargaining power
chooses to bargain with the new partner ﬁrst.11 With probability a half, the draw by Nature
determines that the workers, B and D, have bargaining power, so worker B makes an oﬀer
Xk
BC to C.E m p l o y e r C can continue to bargain with her old worker D with Xk
BC as her
outside option. Worker D will outbid worker B if paying Xk
BC to maintain the old match is
better than becoming unmatched, i.e., if 2Vj − Xk
BC >V 0. Therefore, in order for B to win C
over D, B chooses to oﬀer Xk
BC =2 Vj − V0 (the maximum payoﬀ D is willing to pay to C).
Alternatively, with probability a half it is the employers, A and C, who have bargaining power.
In this case C makes an oﬀer Xk
CB to B, and the same reasoning leads to Xk
CB =2 Vi −V0 (the
maximum payoﬀ A i sw i l l i n gt oo ﬀer B). Note that regardless of who has bargaining power,
if they match together, both B and C receive a payoﬀ that is larger than the maximum they
c a ng e tf r o mt h e i ro l dp a r t n e r s .T h u s ,B and C will form the new match, while A and D will
11The agent who has bargaining power does not have to be careful about the order in which she bargains with
her alternative partners, because she can obtain all the surplus from matching with the new partner in any case.
15become unmatched.12 The expected gains are:








[(2Vk − 2Vi + V0)+( 2 Vj − V0)] − Vj = Vk − Vi,
ΓD = −(Vj − V0).
Case 2: Vk + V0 <V i + Vj. Since the sum of the values of the existing matches exceeds the
sum of the values of the new match and the unmatched, the agent without bargaining power
chooses to bargain with the old partner ﬁrst. With probability one-half, employers A and C
have bargaining power. In this case, worker B chooses to bargain ﬁrst with his old employer,
A. When choosing Xi
AB, A takes into account the fact that B can continue to bargain with
the new potential employer, C, withholding Xi
AB as his outside option. A knows that C
will outbid Xi
AB as long as C’s payoﬀ from forming the new match with B by paying Xi
AB,
namely 2Vk − Xi
AB, is higher than C’s payoﬀ from staying matched with D, 2Vj − V0 (since
C has bargaining power). Therefore, in order for A to win B over C,h e ro ﬀer must satisfy
Xi
AB = Max(V0,2Vk − 2Vj + V0), where V0 is included in Max in order to guarantee that A’s
oﬀer leaves B at least as well oﬀ as he would be by becoming unmatched (2Vk −2Vj +V0 <V 0
if Vk <V j,b u tA still wants B to accept her oﬀer, because preserving the existing match by
paying V0 is better than becoming unmatched). Alternatively, with probability one half, it is
workers B and D who have bargaining power. In this case, employer C chooses to bargain
with her old worker, D, ﬁrst. The same argument applies to the bargaining between C and D.
12Here, although in principle A and D can meet, they cannot form a productive match unless they have drawn
a production opportunity together. In other words, to be able to engage in joint production, two agents must
draw a production opportunity in addition to just meeting. In any case, allowing for the possibility that A and
D have a production opportunity simultaneously with B and C’s will not change our result, since the probability
of such an event is negligible relative to that of the event of a single pair having the opportunity.
















[V0 +2 Vj − Max(V0,2Vk − 2Vi + V0)] − V0.
Figure 4 summarizes the expected gains from trade in double-breach situations. (The ﬁgure
assumes Vi <V j, without loss of generality.)
Figure 4: Double breach: expected capital gains.
If Vi+Vj−V0 <V k,t h e nB and C form a new match. The equilibrium expected side payment
between them is such that the expected gains to each of them is equal to the capital gains to
the new partner, instead of their own capital gain.13 When Vj <V k <V i + Vj − V0, although
13If B and C were to form a new match and there were no side payments, then B would gain Vk − Vi and C
would gain Vk −Vj, but the equilibrium side payments imply that these gains are swapped: B gains Vk −Vj and
C gains Vk −Vi. So when a new match is formed, the agent who is currently in the better match enjoys a larger
capital gain.
17the existing matches continue, the old partner must, on average, pay his current partner her
opportunity cost of giving up the option to form a new match. When Vi <V k <V j,b e c a u s e
the value of the new potential match is not as large as the value of the existing match between
C and D,o na v e r a g e ,A does not have to pay a side payment to B in order to persuade him
to stay in the existing match. But in expectation, D s t i l ln e e d st op a yas i d ep a y m e n tt oC in
order to preserve their valuable match. When Vk <V i, the value of the new potential match
between B and C is so small that on average, A does not have to make a side payment to B,
and D does not have to make a side payment to C.
We summarize the main features of the bargaining outcomes in Proposition 1. The proof of
parts (a) and (b) follows from the above discussion. Part (c) is proved in the Appendix, which
also provides a graphical analysis of the bargaining procedure.
Proposition 1 For given value functions, the matching decisions and side payments are uniquely
determined in the symmetric competitive matching equilibrium through the sequence of bilateral
bargaining. Moreover,
(a) When two agents ﬁnd an opportunity to form a new match, they form the new match and
displace their existing partners (if they have any) if and only if the sum of the values of the new
match and the unmatched exceeds the total value of the existing matches.
(b) Through the side payment, the expected net gain to the agent who forms a new match is
equal to the capital gains of the new partner (instead of her own capital gains).
(c) The equilibrium outcomes (and expected outcomes) induced by the sequence of bilateral bar-
gaining lie in the core.
The bulk of the search and matching literature follows the seminal work of Diamond and
Maskin (1979), Diamond (1982a), and Pissarides (1984) in assuming that agents share rents
according to the axiomatic Nash solution. But the explicit bargaining procedure we propose
seems more appealing for environments with richer interactions among agents (such as double
breaches) in which the equilibrium match-formation decisions and the agents’ outside options
18are not obvious, since our procedure determines them endogenously along with the surplus
sharing.14 In an environment with limited commitment like the one we analyze, this bargaining
procedure is also more appealing than some popular cooperative solution concepts such as the
Shapley value. According to the Shapley value, the winning pair generally leaves some surplus
to the losing partner(s), which is not rational for the winners since they can walk away from
their current matches without penalty.
There is a strand of the matching literature with on-the-job search that considers the special
case of single breach in which two employers compete for a single worker. This literature
assumes that when these situations arise, employers engage in Bertrand competition for the
worker (e.g., Dey and Flinn (2005), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)). For this special case, the
equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining procedure we propose coincide with the ones implied by
Bertrand competition. But in addition, our bargaining game can resolve situations with richer
interactions among agents, such as double breaches.15
In equilibrium, individual agents’ expected payoﬀs satisfy the following Bellman equations:

























− δ(Vi − V0) (6)
for i =1 ,...,N,a n d







0j − V0). (7)
14S e ef o o t n o t e1 7b e l o wf o rm o r eo nt h i s .
15In a previous version of this paper we devised a notion of equilibrium based on a variant of Bertrand compe-
tition that can be applied to all our matching situations, including double breaches. To illustrate, consider the
situation depicted in Figure 3. The structure of the competition we considered speciﬁed that with probability
one-half, A and C have bargaining power. In this case, A makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B, and simultane-
ously, C makes an oﬀer to B and to D–with C’s oﬀer to D being contingent on B’s rejection. (Alternatively,
with probability one-half B and D have bargaining power, etc.) The equilibrium match-creation and destruction
decisions and the expected payoﬀs induced by this Bertrand-like scheme turn out to be identical to those induced
by the bargaining procedure we have adopted here. We favor the sequential bilateral bargaining procedure where
agents can hold outside oﬀers for two reasons. First, it seems to more closely resemble actual negotiations involv-
ing oﬀers and counter-oﬀers. Second, the Bertrand scheme relies on the agents’ ability to make two simultaneous
oﬀers (even though they can match with only one of the candidates), with one of the oﬀers being conditional on
the other oﬀer being rejected–a feature that is not characteristic of actual employment oﬀers.
19Consider, for example, the most general situation illustrated in Figure 3. The return of agent
B, who is in a match of type i with agent A, in equation (6) includes his share of the ﬂow output
generated by the match, yi, plus the expected capital gains he experiences when meeting other
potential partners, minus the expected capital losses he suﬀers when his partner meets other
potential partners, or when the match is destroyed exogenously. The choice of a worker in
a match of type i a n da ne m p l o y e ri nam a t c ho ft y p ej to form a new match of type k is
represented by φk
ij ∈ [0,1]. Conditional on B having met a new partner, nj is the probability
that this new partner is in a match of type j,a n dπk is the probability that the employer-worker
pair draws an opportunity of type k. If the new match is formed, then B gains Vk − Vi plus
sk
ij, which denotes the expected (net) side payment that B receives from the new partner to
form a new match of type k, implied by the bargaining procedure we outlined earlier. (Thus,
sk
ij = −sk
ji.) If the match is not formed, then B may receive an expected side payment zk
ij from
his current partner, A. The collection of negative terms are the expected losses B experiences
when A contacts other agents. For instance, if A meets another agent currently in a match of
type j and they decide to form a new match of type k (which they do with probability φk
ji),
then B gets displaced and loses Vi −V0. Alternatively, B m a yb ea b l et op e r s u a d eA to stay in
the current match by paying her a side payment with expected value zk
ij.16
From part (a) of Proposition 1 we know that φk
ij = φk
ji,a n dφk
ij (Vk + V0 − Vi − Vj)=
maxφk
ij φk
ij (Vk + V0 − Vi − Vj), and from part (b) that Vk + sk
ij − Vi = Vk − Vj,s ot h ev a l u e
functions (6) and (7) reduce to









ij (Vk + V0 − Vi − Vj)









0j (Vk − Vj),
16Strictly speaking, our convention to use φ
k
ij to denote the probability that a worker in a match of type i
a n da ne m p l o y e ri nam a t c ho ft y p ej choose to form a new match of type k means that (6) and (7) are the
value functions of a worker. The value functions corresponding to the employer are the same, except that φij is
replaced by φji everywhere on the right-hand sides of (6) and (7).
20and the value of a match to the pair, λc
i =2 Vi,s a t i s ﬁes
rλc
i − ˙ λ
c





















































The competitive matching equilibrium can now be summarized by a list (λc
i,φ k
ij,n i) for i,j =
0,...,N and k =1 ,...,N that satisﬁes the Bellman equations (8) and (9), the match formation
conditions (10) and the laws of motion (1) and (2).
Notice the similarity between the equilibrium conditions and the planner’s optimality con-
ditions. Comparing (10) and (3) we see that the competitive matching equilibrium shares a
key feature with the social optimum: match formation is privately eﬃcient. That is, under
t h eb a r g a i n i n gp r o c e d u r ew ep r o p o s e d ,for given values of λc
i’s, the individual agents’ utility
maximizing matching decisions imply that a new match is formed only in the cases when doing
so is eﬃcient from the point of view of all the agents involved in the meeting.17
17In contrast, the surplus splitting rule in Diamond and Maskin (1979, 1981) implies that match creation and
destruction is privately ineﬃcient in the absence of exogenous government policy. To understand their result,
consider a simple special case of the double breach illustrated in Figure 3, where C and D are also in a match
of type i, so the situation between B and C is symmetric. Diamond and Maskin propose that B and C split
their matching rents by solving maxs (Vk − s − Vi)(Vk + s − Vi). Clearly, symmetry implies that s =0and
that their respective gains from matching equal Vk − Vi. Therefore, they will choose to leave their partners to
form a new match if Vk − Vi > 0. Note that their decision to match generates 2Vk +2 V0 and destroys 4Vi.
So, there will be instances–speciﬁcally, those where Vk + V0 − 2Vi < 0–in which B and C “leave money on
the table” from the point of view of the four agents involved in the meeting: There is too much breach in the
equilibrium where agents are free to walk away from their partners. Diamond and Maskin point out that private
eﬃciency can be restored if agents are forced to pay what lawyers call “compensatory damages”; i.e., if in order
to separate from their current partners, B and C are required to pay each of them T = Vi − V0.R e n t s a r e
now split by solving maxs (Vk − s − Vi − T)(Vk + s − Vi − T), so the respective gains to B and C if they match
equal Vk + V0 − 2Vi. The payment of compensatory damages forces B and C to internalize the eﬀect that their
match-formation decisions have on their current partners, and consequently the decentralized equilibrium with
this policy generates privately eﬃcient separations. In our bilateral bargaining procedure, the outside option of
B (and C)r e ﬂects what A (and D) is willing to pay, at most 2Vi − V0 (instead of Vi), and thus our competitive
matching equilibrium implements privately eﬃcient separations without the need for government policy.
21The equilibrium values of the match to the pair satisfy very similar conditions to the ones
that the shadow prices of the match must satisfy in a social optimum. In fact, conditions
(8) and (9) would be identical to (4) and (5), were it not for the fact that in the optimality
conditions there is a “2” in front of the contact rate α.T h i sd i ﬀerence is due to a search (or
match-formation) externality: in the decentralized economy, an individual agent does not take
into account the impact that her decisions to form and destroy matches have on the arrival of
opportunities of the other agents. Although the arrival rate of any new opportunity is constant
here, the arrival rate of a new opportunity with a particular type of agent is proportional to
the measure of agents of that type. Also, whether or not a new match is formed depends not
only on the quality of the new potential match, but also on the types of the existing matches.
Therefore, the relevant meeting rate is quadratic, because the total number of contacts between
type i agents and type j agents is equal to αninj.18
The relationship between the equilibrium match values and the planner’s shadow prices can
also be recast as follows. Deﬁne µi = λi − λ0 and µc
i = λc
i − λc
0. Then from (4), (5), (8) and
(9), we have:
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Observe that if we modify the planner’s problem by replacing r in (11) with r0 =2 r + δ,t h e n
the ﬁrst order conditions of this modiﬁed planner’s problem are identical to the equilibrium
conditions for the competitive matching equilibrium in the steady state (˙ µi = ˙ µc
i =0 ), except
that the ﬂow outputs yi all appear multiplied by half for the planner. But a proportional
change of all output levels yi just induces a proportional change in the paths of the µi’s that
18Mortensen (1982) shows that “mating models” in which an agent’s decisions aﬀect other agents’ meeting
probabilities typically fail to achieve the socially optimal allocation due to a search externality. This search
externality may be avoided in an environment with “directed search,” in which workers in matches of productivity
yi look for employers who are in matches of productivity yj, in the designated “i − j island” (e.g., see Felli and
Roberts (2001)). However, we consider the random search framework to be more suitable for our economy, where
every worker and every employer is ex ante homogeneous and productivity diﬀerences are match-speciﬁc.
22solve (11), which does not change the choices of {τk
ij,τk
0j} nor the resulting distribution {ni}
N
i=1.
W es u m m a r i z et h i sr e s u l ta sf o l l o w s :
Proposition 2 A competitive matching equilibrium exists. Moreover, all steady-state competi-
tive matching equilibria satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions of a modiﬁed social planner’s problem,
in which the subjective discount rate, r, is replaced by the higher rate r0 =2 r + δ,w h e r eδ is
the exogenous destruction rate of any match. The allocation that solves the modiﬁed planner’s
problem can be decentralized as a competitive matching equilibrium.
4 Employment Protection
In this section we introduce employment protection policies and characterize their eﬀects on
the equilibrium allocations and payoﬀs. The class of policies we consider speciﬁes that when
an employer breaks a match of type i, she must pay severance compensation Si ≤ Vi − V0 to
the worker she separates from, and a ﬁring tax Ti to the government.19 Note that the policies
apply to separations initiated by employers (“dismissals”) but not to those initiated by workers
(“quits”) and therefore break the symmetry between employers and workers. For this reason
we now let Vi be the value of a worker, Ji the value of an employer, and Mi = Ji + Vi the
v a l u eo fam a t c ho ft y p ei in the equilibrium. Because the employer and the worker in a
match are no longer symmetric, we think of the matched pair without an outside production
opportunity as being involved in continual negotiations, instead of simply splitting the output
equally. Proposition 3, which we prove in the appendix, summarizes the eﬀects that employment
protection policies have on the outcomes of the diﬀerent bargaining situations.
Proposition 3 (a) An unmatched employer and an unemployed worker who draw a new pro-
duction opportunity yk always choose to match, and the expected gain to each equals 1
2 (Mk − M0).
(b) A worker in a match of quality i and an unmatched employer who draw a new production
19In what follows, we will skirt the issue of exactly how a government may be able to collect taxes from agents
in a random-matching economy, as well as why the same government is unable to facilitate the matching process.
23opportunity yk choose to form the new match iﬀ Mk >M i. The expected gains to the worker and
the new employer equal 1
2 max(Mk − M0 − Si,0) and 1
2 max(Mk − Mi,0), respectively. The old
employer’s capital gain equals −1
2 {max[min(Mk,M i) − M0 − Si,0]}.
( c )A ne m p l o y e ri nam a t c ho fq u a l i t yi and an unemployed worker who draw a new production
opportunity yk choose to form the new match iﬀ M0
k ≡ Mk − Ti >M i. The expected gains
to the employer and the new worker equal 1
2 max(M0
k − M0 − Si,0) and 1
2 max(M0
k − Mi,0),
respectively. The old worker’s capital gain equals −1
2 {max[min(M0
k,M i) − M0 − Si,0]}.
(d) An employer in a match of quality i and a worker in a match of quality j who draw
a new production opportunity yk choose to form the new match iﬀ M0
k + M0 >M i + Mj.
The expected gains to the employer and the worker with the new matching opportunity equal
1
2 max(M0
k − Mj − Si,0) and 1
2 max(M0
k − Mi − Sj,0), respectively. The expected gains to the
old employer and the old worker are −1
2 {max[min(M0
k − Mi,M j − M0) − Sj,0]} and
−1
2 {max[min(M0
k − Mj,M i − M0) − Si,0]}.
For given value functions, imposing ﬁring taxes Ti on employers tends to make existing
matches more stable. The reason is that individual creation and destruction decisions depend
on the sum of the payoﬀso fa l lt h ea g e n t si n v o l v e di nam e e t i n g . F o r c i n ge m p l o y e r st op a y
ﬁring taxes to an outside party reduces the total surplus associated with double breaches and
employer-initiated single breaches, so both become less likely. As another corollary to Propo-
sition 3, note that–as one might expect from the Coase Theorem–forcing employers to make
severance payments Si to a worker upon dismissal has no eﬀe c to nt h em a t c hc r e a t i o na n d
destruction decisions, given the value functions. More subtle is the eﬀect that these policies
may have on the value functions themselves, which we turn to next.
Lemma 1 In an equilibrium with employment protection policies, the value of a match of
24quality i =1 ,...,N satisﬁes



































and the sum of the values of an unmatched employer and an unemployed worker satisﬁes
rM0− ˙ M0 = αn0
N X
k=1



















(Lemma 1 is proved in the appendix.) Note that if we set Ti =0for all i,( 1 3 )a n d( 1 4 )
reduce to (8) and (9), and the break-up conditions in Proposition 3 are equivalent to (10).
Interestingly, the value functions are always independent of severance pay, Si. Thus, severance
pay is neutral: it has no eﬀect on the equilibrium allocations or the value of the match (even if
it aﬀects the way the worker and the employer split that value).20
5 Free Entry
S of a rw eh a v eb e e na s s u m i n gc o n s t a n ta n de q u a lp o p u l a t i o n so fe m p l o y e r sa n dw o r k e r s . I n
this section we generalize the formulation by allowing free entry of employers. (The results
corresponding to the alternative formulation with ﬁxed and diﬀerent population sizes will be
obtained as a special case.) Let mj be the number of employers in matches of productivity
yj. We still use ni to denote number of workers employed in matches of productivity yi.S i n c e
matching is one-to-one, mi = ni for all i ≥ 1,b u tm0 (the number of unmatched employers) may
be larger or smaller than n0 (the number of unemployed workers). We assume that a worker
contacts an employer who is currently in a match of type j at rate αmj, while an employer
20The idea that government-mandated transfers between the employer and the worker can be oﬀset by private
contracts between the parties goes back to Lazear (1990). Lazear also notes that severance pay eﬀects are neutral
only when the payment made by the employer is received by the worker, and not if third-party intermediaries
receive or make any of the payments.
25c o n t a c t sar a n d o mw o r k e ri nam a t c ho ft y p ei at rate αni.21 We also assume that unmatched
employers incur a total ﬂow cost C (m0) of posting vacancies, with C0 ≥ 0 and C00 > 0 and
C0 (0) = 0.
We begin by solving the planner’s problem. The planner chooses τk
ij ∈ [0,1] and m0 ≥ 0 to






2yini − C (m0)
#
dt,
subject to the ﬂow constraints


















ji − δni, (15)


















and initial conditions for ni, i =0 ,...,N.L e tλi be the shadow price of a match with produc-




2yini − C (m0) − δ
N X
i=1








ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj).
The optimality conditions for τk







i0 (λk − λi). (17)
The left-hand side of condition (17) is the marginal cost of an unmatched employer (or the
marginal cost of “maintaining a vacancy”), and the right side is the expected return from
having an additional unmatched employer (λk − λi is the capital gain to the planner from
creating a new match of productivity yk by matching an unmatched employer to a worker
employed in a match of productivity yi, while αniπkτk
i0 is the arrival rate of this capital gain).
21In other words, the total number of meetings is given by a quadratic matching technology, αmn,w h e r em is
the total number of employers and n the total number of workers. In our formulation, n =1and m =1 −n0+m0.
In the Appendix we also work out the optimality conditions for the case in which the aggregate meeting technology
is instead given by a function ξ (m,n) which is monotonic in both arguments and homogeneous of degree one.
26The Euler equations are:
















ji)(λk + λ0 − λi − λj),
for i =1 ,...,N,a n d










0j (λk − λj).
We can use the optimality conditions (3) and (17) to rewrite the Euler equations:

















ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj) (18)

















0j (λk − λj). (19)
Conditions (18) and (19) are very similar to those for the model with constant and equal
populations of employers and workers. In particular, note that they reduce to (4) and (5)
respectively if we set C0 =0and m0 = n0. Alternatively, we can set C0 =0but treat the
initial condition for m0 parametrically, to obtain a formulation with ﬁxed but not necessarily
equal populations of employers and workers. In the model with free entry we have an additional
unknown at each date, and (17) provides the additional optimality condition.
Next, we characterize the competitive matching equilibrium using the bargaining procedure
we described in Section 3. Here, we also allow for the employment protection policies introduced
in Section 4, and as in that section, we will let Vi be the value of a worker, Ji the value of an
employer, and Mi = Ji + Vi the value of a match of type i in the equilibrium. Each employer
27w h op o s t sav a c a n c yp a y sc = C0 (m0), while ﬁlled employers do not have to pay anything (e.g.,
because production itself is free advertisement to attract workers).22 The equilibrium outcomes
in the diﬀerent types of bargaining situations are still described by Proposition 3.
A sb e f o r e ,t h ec h o i c eo faw o r k e ri nam a t c ho ft y p ei a n da ne m p l o y e ri nam a t c ho ft y p e
j to form a new match of type k is represented by φk
ij ∈ [0,1]. Given the outcomes of the
bargaining procedure, we have:
Lemma 2 In an equilibrium with employment protection polices and possibly diﬀerent popula-
t i o ns i z e so fe m p l o y e r sa n dw o r k e r s ,t h ev a l u eo fam a t c ho fq u a l i t yi =1 ,...,N satisﬁes



































and the sum of the values of an unmatched employer and an unemployed worker satisﬁes

























where c = C0 (m0).
(Lemma 2 is proved in the appendix.) Since there is free entry of employers, any equilibrium
with a positive measure of unmatched employers must be such that the expected return to an










If we set Ti =0for all i, and then compare (20), (21) and (22) with (18), (19) and (17),
w es e et h a t – j u s ta si nt h ec a s ew i t hﬁxed and equal populations of employers and workers–
the planner’s ﬁrst-order conditions and the equilibrium conditions in the steady state diﬀer
22If C (m0) is strictly convex, proﬁt cm0 − C (m0) is distributed to the owners of the scarce factor in the
vacancy-posting technology. This proﬁt will not aﬀect the labor market because the utility function is linear.
28only in that in his calculations, the planner imputes an “eﬀective” contact rate equal to 2α
i n s t e a do fj u s tα, the contact rate of an individual agent. So following the same logic that
led to Proposition 2, if we replace the subjective discount rate of the social planner, r,w i t h
r0 =2 r + δ, then again, in the steady state the ﬁrst order conditions corresponding to the
modiﬁed planner’s problem correspond to ones of the competitive matching equilibria. And if
the equilibrium is unique, then the equilibrium allocation is identical to that of the modiﬁed
social planner’s economy.
6 Further Analysis and Labor Market Implications
In this section we lay out a version of the model with two productivity levels (N =2 )a n d
restrict our attention to the class of stationary equilibria. Our motivation is twofold. First, we
want to illustrate some of the theoretical results derived in the previous sections, such as the
ineﬃciency of the competitive matching equilibrium (Proposition 2). Second, we want to show
how the theory relates to several strands of the macro-labor literature, and in particular how
it can help conceptualize many of the empirical studies of gross job and worker ﬂows.
We begin by considering the model of Section 3, where there is no government policy, and
the numbers of employers and workers are ﬁxed, equal, and normalized to unity. For this case,
(1) and (2) reduce to
˙ n2 = απ
¡
n2




˙ n1 = α(1 − π)n2
0 − 2απn0n1 − 2απn2
1φ − δn1 (24)
˙ n0 = δ(n1 + n2)+απn2
1φ − αn2
0. (25)
As long as the value function is increasing in the productivity of the current match (V0 <V 1 <
V2) – w h i c hw i l lb et h ec a s e – w ek n o wt h a tφ2
0j =1for j =0 ,1 and that φk
i2 =0for all i and
k. Thus the only non-trivial choice occurs when a worker employed in a match of productivity
y1 meets an employer who is in a match of productivity y1, and they draw an opportunity
to produce y2. To simplify notation, we let φ = φ2
11 and π = π2 (so π1 =1− π). Figure 5
29illustrates the worker ﬂows and Lemma 3 in the appendix establishes that a unique steady state
distribution of workers exists for any given φ ∈ [0,1].
Figure 5: Worker ﬂows for the case of N =2 .
In a stationary equilibrium the value functions satisfy:
rV2 = y2 − δ(V2 − V0)
rV1 = y1 − δ(V1 − V0)+αn0π(V2 − V1)+αn1πφ(V2 + V0 − 2V1)
rV0 = αn0 [π(V2 − V0)+( 1− π)(V1 − V0)] + αn1π (V2 − V1).
From Proposition 1 we know that φ =1with certainty if and only if V2 + V0 − 2V1 > 0.W e




α[πn1 +( 1− π)n0]
r + δ + α(n0 + πn1)
, (26)
where n0 and n1 are the steady state numbers of matches, i.e., n0 and n1 satisfy (23)—(25) with
˙ n2 = ˙ n1 = ˙ n0 =0(see Lemma 3 for details). Since the right side of (26) is bounded, it is clear
that φ =1with certainty for y2/y1 large enough. In these cases, the agents involved will destroy
two middle-productivity matches in order to form a single high-productivity match whenever the
30opportunity arises. Perhaps more surprisingly, notice that there is always some x>0 such that
φ =1for all y2/y1 > 2−x. That is, there is always a range of the productivity diﬀerential y2/y1
for which two middle-productivity matches are destroyed to form a single high-productivity
match even if this entails a reduction in current output. To ﬁnd a stationary equilibrium, let
ni (φ) denote the steady state number of matches of productivity yi as characterized in Lemma




r+δ+α[n0(φ)+πn1(φ)] − 2.F r o m t h i s w e s e e t h a t
φ =1is an equilibrium if Φ(1) > 0, φ =0is an equilibrium if Φ(0) < 0,a n dφ∗ ∈ [0,1]
is an equilibrium if Φ(φ∗)=0 .T h e m a p Φ is continuous on [0,1], so there always exists a
stationary equilibrium. However, an equilibrium is not always unique, leading to the possibility
of coordination failure.23
Given (26), Proposition 2 tells us that the social planner chooses to destroy a pair of matches




2α[πn1 +( 1− π)n0]
r + δ +2 α(n0 + πn1)
, (27)
with n0 and n1 again given by Lemma 3. Notice that here there also are instances in which the
planner chooses to destroy two matches of productivity y1 to create a single match of produc-
tivity y2 at the cost of reducing current output. From a static point of view, this may come as
a surprise, since unmatched agents are unproductive; but from the planner’s dynamic perspec-
tive, unmatched agents are a valued input in the matching process because the unmatched pair
helps other agents climb the productivity ladder. Hence, for some parametrizations (e.g., y2/y1
slightly below 2), the planner may choose to reduce current output as a form of investment, in
order to increase future output with a larger number of high productivity matches. This intu-
ition can be formalized by noticing that the right-hand side of (27) approaches 2 as r becomes
large. The higher the degree of impatience, the less willing the planner is to trade oﬀ current
for future production.
23The coordination failure may arise here, because the matching technology is eﬀectively quadratic, and exhibits
increasing returns-to-scale. See Diamond (1982b) and Mortensen (1989) for more on this type of coordination
failure. We can show that π ≥
1
3 is a suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness of the steady state competitive
equilibrium with N =2 . In what follows, we continue the discussion for the case of unique equilibrium.
31From (26) and (27) we also learn that failing to internalize the search externality makes
atomistic agents less willing to destroy middle matches relative to the planner. To understand
why this is the case, recall that from Proposition 2 we know that the competitive matching
equilibrium corresponds to a modiﬁed planner’s economy with a higher discount rate r0 =2 r+δ.
Thus the modiﬁed planner is less willing to trade oﬀ current for future output. Consequently,
the modiﬁed planner is (agents in the competitive matching equilibrium are) less willing to
trade two matches of productivity y1 for two agents in a match of productivity y2 and two
unmatched agents.
Figure 6 illustrates the diﬀerence between the relevant destruction margins in the eﬃcient
and the competitive solutions. On the horizontal axis is r, the discount rate, and on the
vertical axis y2/y1, the relevant measure of inequality in instantaneous productivities. Notice
that the (n0,n 1) pair that appears in (26) is identical to that in (27), both satisfy (23)—(25)
with ˙ n2 = ˙ n1 = ˙ n0 =0 , and are independent of y1, y2 and r. The solid lines with the higher and
lower intercepts are conditions (26) and (27), respectively, at equality. As in the competitive
economy, we know that for the social planner’s economy τ2
0j =1for j =0 ,1,a n dt h a tτk
i2 =0for
all i and k, and therefore we use τ to denote τ2
11, the only nontrivial decision. Double breaches
occur in the competitive equilibrium only for parametrizations that lie above the higher solid
line. In contrast, the planner implements double breaches for parametrizations that lie above
the lower solid line. For any given degree of impatience r, the competitive and the eﬃcient
allocations coincide only if the ﬂow productivity diﬀerential y2/y1 is either large enough (i.e.,
above the higher solid line) or small enough (below the lower solid line). For intermediate
values the allocations diﬀer relative to the eﬃcient benchmark: matches of productivity y1 are
too stable in the competitive economy.
It is possible to design policies that bring the competitive allocation in line with the plan-
ner’s. For example, suppose every agent receives a payoﬀ b>0 while unmatched, and that
this transfer is paid for by levying a tax Te from every matched agent. The balanced-budget
32Figure 6: Destruction regions for the case with N =2 .
condition is bn0 = Te (n1 + n2). The Bellman equations for the competitive economy become
rˆ V2 = y2 − Te − δ(ˆ V2 − ˆ V0)
rˆ V1 = y1 − Te − δ(ˆ V1 − ˆ V0)+αn0π(ˆ V2 − ˆ V1)+αn1πφ(ˆ V2 + ˆ V0 − 2ˆ V1)
rˆ V0 = b + αn0
h
π(ˆ V2 − ˆ V0)+( 1− π)(ˆ V1 − ˆ V0)
i
+ αn1π(ˆ V2 − ˆ V1).
Notice that this policy can only aﬀect the ﬂow equations (23)—(25) indirectly through their
eﬀect on the separation decision φ. S of o rag i v e nφ, the stationary distribution of agents
across states is still described by Lemma 3. However, now φ =1with certainty if and only if






α[πn1 +( 1− π)n0]
r + δ + α(n0 + πn1)
. (28)




αn0 (r + δ)[πn1 +( 1− π)n0]
[r + δ +2 α(n0 + πn1)](r + δ + απn0)
y1,
33then (28) coincides with (27). In other words, the compensation b∗ = n1+n2
n0 T∗
e makes agents
internalize the search externality in the competitive matching equilibrium and implements the
planner’s match creation and destruction decisions.24
To explore the eﬀects of employment protection policies, we now turn to the more general
formulation of Section 5. We introduce employment protection policies akin to the ones observed
in many actual economies and allow for the number of unmatched employers (m0)t od i ﬀer from
the number of unemployed workers (n0). We now use T to denote the ﬁring tax that an employer
who breaks a match must pay to the government.25 The laws of motion for the numbers of
w o r k e r si ne a c ht y p eo fm a t c ha r e
˙ n2 = απ
¡




˙ n1 = α(1 − π)m0n0 − δn1 − απ
¡
ψn0n1 + m0n1 +2 φn2
1
¢
˙ n0 = απφn2
1 + δ(n1 + n2) − αm0n0,
where φ = φ2
11 is the probability of a double breach, and ψ = φ2
01 denotes the probability that
an employer in a low productivity match initiates a single breach.26 The values of a match to
the pair in the stationary equilibrium satisfy:
rM2 =2 y2 − δ(M2 − M0)





2 + n1φ(M2 + M0 − 2M1 − T)
¤
rM0 = −c + α(m0 + n0)
£
πM2−M0










where c = C0 (m0).
From Proposition 3 we know that ψ =1if and only if M2−M1−T>0. Using the Bellman
24Here, the subsidy to the unmatched agents is beneﬁcial because it internalizes search externalities and not
because it provides insurance. A single subsidy and tax rate are enough to achieve the eﬃc i e n ta l l o c a t i o ni nt h i s
case with N =2 , but this need not be the case with more heterogeneity of matches (N>2).
25We do not specify any severance payments here, because they have no eﬀect on match formation and
destruction decisions, which is what we focus on hereafter.
26These are the only nontrivial decisions in this setting, since φ
k
00 =1for k =1 ,2, φ
2
10 =1 ,a n dφ
k
ij =0if
either i ≥ k or j ≥ k.








Also, from Proposition 3 we know that φ =1if and only if M2 + M0 − 2M1 − T>0,a n dt h i s
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Note that if we set m0 = n0 and c = T =0 , then (29) reduces to (26), the condition for double
breaches to occur in the model with equal population sizes and no employment protection.
Condition (29) is harder to satisfy for larger T:h i g h e rﬁring taxes make double breaches less
likely. In general, there will be two cutoﬀs, Tφ and Tψ,w i t hTφ <T ψ, such that neither double
breaches nor employer-initiated single breaches take place if T>T ψ, single but no double
breaches occur if Tφ <T<T ψ, and the match formation and destruction decisions are as in
the model with no taxes if T<T φ.
The model has clear predictions regarding individual agents’ employment histories, the
various attributes of diﬀerent types of jobs, and how they are aﬀected by policy. For example,
consider a job of productivity y2 (a “good job”) and another of productivity y1 (a “bad job”).
Then, good jobs are not only better paid, but also more stable. Good jobs are more stable
than bad jobs in the sense that the expected time until a worker gets displaced is 1
δ for the job
of productivity y2 and 1
δ+απ(ψn0+φn1) for the job of productivity y1.27 Employment protection
policies (e.g., T>T ψ)c o u l di n d u c eφ = ψ =0a n dr e n d e rt y p e1 matches just as stable as type
2 matches. When displaced from a job of productivity i, the worker suﬀers a capital loss equal
to Vi − V0, and it will typically take him some time to climb back up to a job of productivity
27Instead of measuring how stable a match is in terms of the expected time it takes the worker to get ﬁred,
we could measure it in terms of the expected time it takes the worker to ﬁrst ﬁnd himself unemployed,w h i c hi s
δ+απ(m0+φn1)
δ[δ+απ(m0+ψn0+2φn1)] for a worker in a match of productivity y1 and 1
δ for one in a match of productivity y2.
35equal to or higher than the one he was displaced from. So the model is also consistent with the
basic fact that displaced workers suﬀer signiﬁcant and persistent income losses (see Jacobson
et al. (1993) or Violante (2002)).28
As we mentioned earlier, there is a large body of empirical work that studies the properties
of job and worker ﬂows. One strand of this literature documents the sheer size of these ﬂows,
while another focuses on cross-country diﬀerences and tries to relate them to diﬀerences in
labor market regulations.29 O u rm o d e lc a nh e l po r g a n i z em a n yo ft h ee m p i r i c a lﬁndings. To
illustrate, we ﬁrst carry out in the theory, the same gross ﬂows accounting exercises as Davis
and Haltiwanger have pioneered with actual data.
Figure 7 displays the ﬁve types of transitions that an employer and a worker can ﬁnd
themselves in, and summarizes the basic calculations involved in computing the theoretical,
“real-time” counterparts of the gross ﬂows.30 Let JC(t) and JD(t) denote gross job creation
a n dd e s t r u c t i o no v e rap e r i o do fl e n g t ht.T h e n








+ δ(n1 + n2)
¤
t,
and job reallocation is JR(t) = JC(t) + JD(t).
Let H(t) denote the number of hires, L(t) t h en u m b e ro fl a y o ﬀs (employer-initiated sep-
arations plus matches destroyed exogenously) and Q(t) the number of quits (worker-initiated
28For example, suppose a worker is displaced from a job of productivity y1 (i.e., either his match is hit by the
exogenous destruction shock δ, or his employer ﬁres him in order to form a new match of productivity y2 with
another worker). The expected time it takes this worker to ﬁn dh i m s e l fi naj o bt h a tp a y sa tl e a s ta sw e l la st h e
one he lost is
1
α(m0+πψn1). And it takes a worker who gets displaced from a job of productivity y2 even longer
to see his income recover to the pre-displacement level; on average, precisely
δ+α[(1−π)m0+πψn0+2πφn1]
απ{δ(m0+ψn1)+α[π(m0+ψn1)(m0+ψn0+2φn1)+(1−π)(m0+φn1)m0]}.
29The ﬁrst strand stems from the work of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), while examples of the second include
Millard and Mortensen (1997), Bertola and Rogerson (1997), Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), Mortensen and
Pissarides (1999), Blanchard and Portugal (2001), and Pries and Rogerson (2005).
30T h ea c t u a ld a t au s e dt oc o n s t r u c tt h ee m p i r i c a lj o bﬂows are collected rather infrequently, usually quarterly.
Since our model economy is set in continuous time, we can compute all ﬂows in “real time.” We do this ﬁrst,
and address the issue of time-aggregation below. Also, empirical ﬂows are usually normalized by a measure of
the average employment level, but we omit this normalization to simplify the exposition.
36Figure 7: Job and worker ﬂows accounting.

























and total separations are S(t) = L(t) + Q(t). The empirical studies typically focus on worker
turnover, WT(t) = H(t) + S(t),o ro nw o r k e rr e a l l o c a t i o n ,WR(t), as measures of gross worker





m0n1 +2 ψn1n0 +2 φn2
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¢
+ δ(n1 + n2)
¤
t.
In the model, workers only quit to take better jobs, so the number of job-to-job transitions
37o v e rap e r i o do fl e n g t ht is JJ(t) = Q(t). Since employers can also search while matched, they
can make “worker-to-worker” transitions, the natural counterpart to the workers’ job-to-job
transitions. In fact, as we discussed in the introduction, the available evidence indicates that
those types of transitions, often referred to as “replacement hiring” in the empirical literature,
are actually quite prevalent in actual economies. In the model, replacement hiring in the
aggregate, over a period of length t,i s
RH(t) = απn1 (ψn0 + φn1)t. (30)
Intuitively, RH(t) conveys how frequently employers churn their workers, while JJ(t) is a mea-
sure of how frequently workers churn their employers.31
Having exact theoretical counterparts to all the empirical notions of job and worker ﬂows
makes it easier to appreciate the relationships between the diﬀerent measures used in the liter-
ature.32 For example, job-to-job transitions account for the diﬀerence between worker turnover
and worker reallocation: WT(t) − WR(t) = JJ(t). Perhaps a more common measure of worker
ﬂo w si ne x c e s so fj o bﬂo w si st h ed i ﬀerence between worker turnover and job reallocation (e.g.,
this is the notion of churning used by Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000)):
WT(t) − JR(t) =2 RH(t). (31)
So in the model–as in the data–worker turnover is larger than gross job reallocation.33 In-
stances of replacement hiring lie behind this discrepancy, since job creation and destruction are
unchanged when a ﬁrm ﬁres a worker to replace him with an unemployed one, yet these events
add two transitions (one for each worker involved) to the worker turnover count.
31In fact, RH
(t) − JJ
(t) = απn1 (ψn0 − m0)t, so in general the diﬀerence depends on policy as well as on
the relative numbers of unmatched employers and unemployed workers. For example, job-to-job transitions will
exceed replacement hiring if T>T ψ, and the magnitude of the diﬀerence is larger the greater the number of
unmatched employers. Admittedly, capacity constraints are rather stark in our model (i.e., each employer can
be matched with one worker), and perhaps overemphasize replacement hiring. We leave to future research the
challenging–but potentially rewarding–analysis of a formulation with more general decreasing returns-to-scale.
32This is not a minor point. For example, Davis and Haltiwanger (1999, p. 82) point out that some studies
have failed to appreciate the conceptual diﬀerences between gross worker reallocation and total turnover.
33See Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999), Anderson and Meyer (1994), Hamermesh, Hassink and van Ours
(1996), Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), Albæk and Sørensen (1998), and Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000).
38Some recent cross-country empirical studies have found that job reallocation turns out to
be roughly similar across countries with very diﬀerent labor market policies. Instead, the diﬀer-
ences are in worker turnover.34 This seems to indicate that understanding the nature of worker
turnover, and in particular, what determines worker turnover in excess of job reallocation, is
key to understanding the role of policy in shaping labor market outcomes. Addressing these
issues requires a theory that distinguishes between job and worker ﬂows, a distinction which
is absent from the bulk of the vast existing literature that uses matching models to assess the
eﬀects of labor market policy.
Combining (30) and (31) makes it clear how employment protection policies determine the
amount of worker turnover in excess of job reallocation: for example, they will not diﬀer much
under very stringent regulations (e.g., T close to Tψ) .A sc a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e7 ,e m p l o y m e n t
protection policies hinder precisely the kinds of transitions that generate worker ﬂows in excess
of job ﬂows (those in the third and fourth rows in the ﬁgure). Along these lines, Blanchard and
Portugal (2001) ﬁnd that relative to the United States, worker ﬂows are smaller in Portugal
even for given job ﬂows. For instance, they estimate the ﬂow of workers out of employment to
be roughly between 1.5 and 2 times larger than job destruction in the United States, while in
Portugal that ﬂow barely exceeds job destruction. In our model, all workers exiting employment
ﬂow into unemployment; let L(t) denote these layoﬀs. We ﬁnd L(t) − JD(t) = RH(t) − JJ(t).
Policy aﬀects this magnitude directly through its eﬀects on the single breach decision ψ,a n d
indirectly through its eﬀe c to nt h ec o m p o s i t i o no ft h ep o p u l a t i o n ,m0, n0,a n dn1.
So far our theoretical accounting exercise has implicitly assumed access to real-time data.
B u tm a n yd a t aa r eo n l ya v a i l a b l ea tap o i n ti nt i m e ,e . g . ,w ek n o wt h ee m p l o y m e n tl e v e lo fa
given establishment at dates t and t+1, but have no information on what happened during the
time interval (t,t +1 ) . Any attempt to measure employment-to-employment transitions, for
34Bertola and Rogerson (1997) were the ﬁrst to note the fact that job reallocation rates do not vary much
across countries with very diﬀerent employment protection policies, such as Italy, Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. They also pointed out that average job tenures seem to be longer in regulated
countries, suggesting that policy diﬀerences manifest themselves in worker turnover rates. See Pries and Rogerson
(2005) for a summary of more recent evidence.
39instance, faces this time-aggregation problem and as a result may include as a single job-to-job
transition an employer change, while there was an intervening period of nonemployment or even
multiple employers between survey dates. There is usually no way of knowing the size or even
t h es i g no ft h i sb i a s . 35
In order to have an exact mapping between the accounting in the theory and that done
for actual economies, next we will subject the theoretical accounting exercise to the same data
limitations empirical researchers face. Lemma 4 in the appendix shows that the stochastic
process that rules the evolution of a worker’s state can be summarized by a matrix [p
(t)
ij ].F o r
t h es i m p l ec a s eo fN =2the matrix is 3×3,a n dp
(t)
ij represents the probability that the worker
ﬁnds himself in state j at date t0 +t given that he was in state i at date t0. Arguments similar
to those that lead to Lemma 4 can be used to show that the stochastic process that rules the
e v o l u t i o no fa ne m p l o y e r ’ ss t a t ec a nb es u m m a r i z e db yam a t r i x[ˆ p
(t)
ij ], where ˆ p
(t)
ij represents the
probability that an employer ﬁnds herself in state j at date t0 + t, given she was in state i at
date t0. With the matrices [p
(t)
ij ] and [ˆ p
(t)
ij ] in hand, and given our economy is set in continuous
time, we can compute any variable of interest and subject it to an arbitrary degree of time-
aggregation. For example, suppose that a period of length t elapses between worker surveys.
























t.T h e ﬁrst term on the right of
(32) is the ﬂow of workers who transit from a match of productivity y2 to another match of
productivity y2 during a time interval of length t (after subtracting those who never left the
same match, with probability e−δt). The second term is the similar worker ﬂow from a match
of productivity y1 to another match of productivity y1.
Now consider again the basic empirical ﬁnding that worker turnover is much larger than
35Fallick and Fleischman (2001), for example, explicitly acknowledge this problem and choose to classify all
workers who report diﬀerent employers in the two months they were surveyed as having had a (single) job-to-job
transition.
40job reallocation. Since the former is calculated as the sum of all hires and separations over a
given time interval, while job creation and job destruction are constructed from point-in-time
employment data, one may wonder to what extent the amount of worker turnover in excess
of job reallocation is a mere artifact of a time-aggregation bias. To answer this question,
suppose employment data is only available at intervals of length t, and compute the time-







(t) = n1ˆ p
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(t). Using the theory, the
diﬀerence between measured worker turnover and job reallocation can be written as
WT(t) − JR





The amount of worker turnover in excess of what would be needed to accommodate the reallo-
cation of jobs across establishments is composed of two parts, a “genuine” churning component,
and another component which is purely due to a time-aggregation bias in job ﬂows. A parame-
trized version of the model can be used to assess how the relative sizes of the genuine churning
component and the component due to time-aggregation depend upon the data frequency, say
monthly versus quarterly–another example of how the theory can serve as a guide to under-
standing the nature of job and worker ﬂows.36
7 Related Literature
In this section we discuss how our paper relates to the existing literature on labor-market match-
ing models with on-the-job search. Burdett (1978) adds on-the-job search to the single-agent
36To be clear, the empirical observation that worker ﬂows exceed job ﬂows at the establishment level is not,
per se, unquestionable evidence supporting the empirical relevance of the employer-initiated separations in our
theory. That is, the transitions that account for the excess worker turnover may not be exclusively due to the
fact that, in order to hire a new worker with whom he has a more productive opportunity, the employer must ﬁre
an existing employee due to capacity constraints. In principle, the observation is also consistent with separations
that occur for other reasons (e.g., as captured by the δ-shock in the model) but are followed by a relatively
quick replacement. Our view on this issue is that, from a theoretical standpoint, it is desirable to allow for the
possibility that employers churn their workers (by engaging in replacement hiring), just as we allow workers to
churn their employers (by engaging in job-to-job transitions). But also from an empirical standpoint, there are
advantages to having a theory which exhibits both replacement hiring as well as separations followed by quick
replacement. For one thing, as (33) suggests, such a theory can be used to extract more information from the
available data in order to uncover what lies behind the excess worker reallocation at the micro level.
41search decision problem faced by a worker who samples wages from an exogenous distribution.
Mortensen (1978) studies the relationship between the nature of the wage bargaining problem
b e t w e e naw o r k e ra n da ne m p l o y e ra n dt h e i rc h o i c e so fo n - t h e - j o bs e a r c hi n t e n s i t i e s . H eo b -
serves that the search intensities the employer and worker choose in a Nash equilibrium of the
noncooperative game are too high relative to those that would be chosen jointly to maximize
the value of the match.37
Diamond and Maskin (1979) extend Mortensen (1978) by embedding the search problem
of the single partnership in an equilibrium model with many potential partnerships. They
study the steady-state equilibria of a model in which agents are randomly paired in a costly
search process to carry out a single productive project. As in our setup, agents are ex ante
homogeneous, but matches are heterogeneous ex post and utility is transferable. The two
key diﬀerences in our frameworks are that in that model (i) agents always split the match
surplus symmetrically, and (ii) in anticipation of possible breaches, contracts may provide
for compensation or “damages” to be paid to the breached-against partner, which requires
that agents have the ability to commit to future actions or else that “courts” exogenously
enforce these contracts. Diamond and Maskin show that if the partner who breaks the match
is required to fully compensate the breached-against partner for the loss she suﬀers, then, as
in our competitive matching equilibrium, the two individuals with the option to form a new
match ﬁnd it in their interest to breach precisely when by doing so they increase the sum
of the expected payoﬀs of the four parties involved in the meeting. The diﬀerence is that
our competitive matching equilibrium achieves this outcome through a more ﬂexible bargaining
process involving side payments, without requiring that agents be able to commit to compensate
37Mortensen explores the ability of two alternative mechanisms to improve eﬃciency when agents choose their
search strategies noncooperatively. The mechanisms do not require direct monitoring, but rely on both agents’
ability to commit to future actions. The ﬁrst is an ex ante agreement by each partner to make a counteroﬀer
when the other receives an attractive alternative matching opportunity. The second is an ex ante agreement to
fully compensate the other partner as a precondition for separation. Relative to the joint wealth maximizing
strategy, both partners search too much in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium under the mechanism with
commitment to counteroﬀer. But under the commitment to fully compensate the partner in case of separation,
the Nash noncooperative equilibrium delivers the pair of search strategies that maximize the joint surplus.
42t h e i rp a r t n e r si nc a s eo ff u t u r eb r e a c h e s . 38
Wolinski (1987) also studies a matching model in which agents form bilateral relationships
and can search for alternative partners while matched. The model builds on Diamond and
Maskin (1979), but diﬀers in that instead of assuming the axiomatic Nash solution, the surplus
split between matched agents is determined by an explicit noncooperative bargaining game.
In this sense, our work is similar to Wolinski’s. However, the key diﬀerence between his work
and ours is that he maintains the assumption that an agent cannot negotiate with two or more
partners at the same time: upon meeting an alternative partner, a matched agent has to decide
immediately whether to withdraw from his current match and form the new match or to reject
the new opportunity to continue with the ongoing bargaining process.
The model in Burdett, Imai and Wright (2004) has ex ante homogeneous agents, ex post
heterogeneous matches, costly search, and agents who, while matched, decide whether to search
or not. They consider two setups. In the ﬁrst setup, they assume that once two agents make
contact, they cannot observe the realization of their prospective match productivity unless they
drop their current partners (if they have any).39 Utility may be interpreted to be transferable
or not in this setup. For this version of the model they provide a full characterization of the
equilibrium set and its welfare properties. The second setup allows agents to keep the option
to stay with their current partners after observing the realization of the match quality with
a prospective partner. They lay out the model with two types of matches and argue that
their main results (e.g., multiplicity and eﬃciency properties of equilibria) are robust to this
38In Diamond and Maskin (1979) agents match to produce once and for all. In some unpublished notes,
Diamond and Maskin (1981) extend that framework to allow for continuous production. Their physical envi-
ronment corresponds to the special case of our economy with N =2 . In this version they continue to assume
that partners split the matching surplus symmetrically and that when a partner separates, she must pay the
breached-against partner compensatory damages, and explore some properties of a steady-state equilibrium in
which single breaches occur but double breaches do not.
39This assumption makes their model extremely tractable by eliminating “composition eﬀects”: The gains
from forming a match of a given quality are the same regardless of the state of the other partner, so the value
functions are independent of the endogenous distribution of match qualities among actual relationships. The fact
that payoﬀs depend on the distribution of characteristics of potential partners is a feature that arises naturally
in our model and in many other matching models, both with ex post match heterogeneity and on-the-job search
(e.g., Diamond and Maskin (1979, 1981)) and with ex ante heterogeneity, even with no on-the-job search (e.g.,
Burdett and Coles (1997) and Shimer and Smith (2000, 2001)).
43generalization. This second setup relies on the assumption that utility is nontransferable.40
This must be so because if utility were transferable, then matched agents would attempt to
counter their partners’ outside oﬀers just as they do in our model. So, although the physical
environment of Burdett, Imai and Wright (2004) is close to ours, their analysis is quite diﬀerent
because they make assumptions that rule out the multilateral breach situations that are an
essential part of our notion of equilibrium.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) develop an inﬂuential on-the-job search model with ex ante
homogeneous populations of employers and workers.41 Employers are assumed to post and
commit to wages, have access to a constant returns-to-scale production technology, and may
employ any number of workers at the posted wage. Whenever an employed worker meets an
employer with a posted wage higher than her current wage, she quits to join the new employer’s
workforce. Therefore, employers who post low wages experience high quit rates and have smaller
workforces in the steady state. By requiring that steady-state proﬁtb ee q u a t e da c r o s sﬁrms,
Burdett and Mortensen derive a nondegenerate equilibrium wage distribution. Note that there
is an extreme notion of commitment at work in this model: once the employer has chosen a
wage to oﬀer its employees, the assumption is that it cannot be changed. It cannot be raised
to counter a worker’s outside oﬀer, and it cannot be cut down once the outside oﬀer is gone.
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) work out an extension of Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
with ex ante heterogeneous employers and workers. Employers still have the power to make
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to workers but are, in addition, allowed to counter the oﬀers that their
workers receive from competing employers.42 Relative to Burdett—Mortensen, the extension of
40The on-the-job search model of Cornelius (2003) also assumes utility is nontransferable, but diﬀers from
Burdett, Imai and Wright (2004) in that agents are ex ante heterogeneous, search is costless both on and oﬀ the
job, and the meeting technology is quadratic.
41The Burdett-Mortensen model was originally developed to explain wage dispersion among homogeneous
workers and relate it to employer size, but has by now been extended in many ways and applied to study a wide
range of issues, both empirical and theoretical. Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and Bontemps, Robin and van
den Berg (1999, 2000) are examples of papers that have structurally estimated the model. Theoretical extensions
and applications include Burdett and Coles (2003) and Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2004). See Manning (2003)
and Mortensen (2003) for other applications and more references.
42Instead of giving the ﬁrm the power to make a worker take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, Dey and Flinn (2005) assume
employers and workers in continuing relationships split the match surplus according to the Nash cooperative
44Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) assumes a weaker form of commitment: Firms still commit not
to reduce wages in the future, but can counter outside oﬀers. In a diﬀerent way, the extension
of Coles (2001) also assumes a weaker form of commitment, this time by assuming ﬁrms cannot
respond to outside oﬀers but can change wages during times when their workforce has no outside
oﬀers outstanding. From this perspective, our paper diﬀers from the literature in that neither
employers nor workers can commit to any future actions.
Another relevant diﬀerence is that in the Burdett—Mortensen approach, each employer oper-
ates a constant returns-to-scale production technology that can, in principle, employ the whole
population of workers. So if there are heterogeneous employers, it would be desirable–and
technologically feasible–to have all workers matched to the highest-productivity employer. In
contrast, we study the consequences of the opposite assumption to constant returns by as-
suming that each employer can hire at most one worker. This extreme version of decreasing
returns enriches the sets of transitions that employers and workers can engage in, with no loss
of tractability. For example, the model delivers endogenous “ﬁring” in addition to endoge-
nous “quits.” Also, the limited-capacity assumption allows the model to exhibit instances of
replacement hiring as well as situations in which–in the language of the empirical labor ﬂows
literature–job reallocation induces worker reallocation and vice versa.
In Pissarides (1994, 2000), employed workers can search on the job, but employers do not
(so all quits involve workers taking jobs that were previously vacant), and the wage is assumed
to be determined according to a linear surplus splitting rule at all times. Relative to what we
do here, a key diﬀerence is that both in Pissarides (1994, 2000) and in Shimer (2004), matched
employers are not allowed to oﬀer side payments to counter their worker’s outside oﬀers, and
similarly, a vacant employer who contacts an employed worker cannot make side payments
to persuade the worker to quit. Competition involving side payments among all the parties
involved in a typical on-the-job search meeting is an essential feature of the equilibrium in the
model we develop here. Also, we propose a competitive bargaining procedure to split the gains
solution.
45from trade instead of relying on surplus splitting rules or the Nash axiomatic approach.43
Our labor-market analysis in Section 6 was partly motivated by the evidence in Bertola
and Rogerson (1997) and Blanchard and Portugal (2001), i.e., by the observation that worker
turnover in Europe is substantially smaller than in the United States, whereas–despite the dif-
ferences in labor-market policy regimes–job reallocation is roughly the same. With Blanchard
and Portugal (2001) and Pries and Rogerson (2005) we share this observation as a motivation
for developing a model that can help us understand the nature and the distinct allocative roles
played by job ﬂows and worker ﬂows. Blanchard and Portugal (2001) argue that policies that
increase unemployment durations decrease worker turnover by discouraging quits to unemploy-
ment. Pries and Rogerson (2005) develop a matching model that combines features of the
Jovanovic (1979) learning model with the matching model of Pissarides (1985).44
In terms of distinguishing between job ﬂows and worker ﬂows, the key diﬀerence with
Pries and Rogerson (2005) is that they abstract from on-the-job search for both employers and
workers. For this reason, an employer who wishes to replace a worker is forced to become
vacant before re-matching, and similarly, a worker is forced to go through unemployment in
order to switch jobs. Thus, if an accountant were to survey this employer and this worker right
after their separation, she would record an instance of job destruction as well as a transition
toward the worker-turnover count. In other words, conceptually, that model is not able to
distinguish between job and worker ﬂows in real-time data.45 In contrast, in our continuous-
time model where both employers and workers continue to search while matched, instances of
replacement hiring will generate worker ﬂo w si ne x c e s so fj o bﬂows in real time, even without
time-aggregation in the job ﬂows. We showed how theory can be used to measure which fraction
43Shimer (2004) points out that in the context of the on-the-job search model of Pissarides (1994, 2000), a
simple linear surplus splitting rule is in general not equivalent to the Nash bargaining solution and that adopting
the former may lead to pair-wise ineﬃcient outcomes.
44In their model, when an employer and a worker meet, they observe a signal about the match’s true quality
prior to deciding whether to form the match, and matches are formed only if the signal exceeds a threshold value.
The true quality of the match is revealed over time but through production, only if the match is formed. They
then analyze how various labor-market regulations aﬀect hiring through their eﬀe c t so nt h et h r e s h o l ds i g n a l .
45Time-aggregation is the only reason why labor-market policies may aﬀect job reallocation and worker turnover
diﬀerently in that setup.
46of the worker ﬂo w si ne x c e s so fj o bﬂows is due to workers churning over existing jobs, as opposed
to the result of time-aggregation.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have developed a model of on-the-job search that has many of the stylized properties
of actual labor markets. Worker ﬂows exceed job ﬂows, displaced agents suﬀer persistent
reductions in permanent incomes, job-to-job transitions are common, and ﬁrms often engage
in simultaneous hiring and ﬁring. We have proposed and analyzed a notion of competitive
equilibrium based on a particular bargaining procedure and explored its eﬃciency properties.
Several extensions seem worth pursuing. First, motivated by the observations in Bertola
and Rogerson (1997) and Blanchard and Portugal (2001), the model could be used to quantify
the eﬀects that employment protection policies have on the amount of worker reallocation in
excess of job reallocation. Bertola and Rogerson ﬁnd that despite higher employment protection
in Europe than in the United States, European job turnover rates are not that diﬀerent from
those in the United States, yet there is evidence that worker turnover is lower in Europe. Our
model suggests a simple explanation for these observations: Employment protection policies
censor precisely the transitions that cause worker turnover in excess of job turnover, namely,
separations resulting from double breaches and from employer-initiated single breaches.46
A related issue is that, given the empirical relevance of job-to-job ﬂows, an appropriate
assessment of the welfare eﬀects of employment protection policies calls for a model with on-
the-job search, perhaps along the lines we have proposed here. Calculating the welfare eﬀects
of employment protection policies with a model that does not allow for job-to-job transitions is
likely to understate the welfare losses from these policies, since they aﬀect the overall eﬃciency
of job-worker matches through their eﬀects on worker ﬂows in addition to their eﬀects on job
ﬂows.
46This would complement the work of Pries and Rogerson (2005), who study this question from another angle,
by focusing on the eﬀect that labor market policies have on hiring practices.
47At a deeper level, we would also like to understand why employment protection policies
exist. In our framework with one-employer-to-one-worker matching and transferable utility,
workers and employers are inherently symmetric (even if allowing for free entry of employers
or certain policies introduces a slight asymmetry), and employment protection policies result
in no eﬃciency gains. To explore the rationale behind employment protection policies, perhaps
we have to introduce some fundamental asymmetry, such as that each worker works for one
employer while each employer hires several workers. This extension would also be useful to
study issues related to the size distribution of ﬁrms, including the relationship between ﬁrm
size and job and worker ﬂows.
48A Appendix
Bargaining outcomes and the core.
Before proving part (c) of Proposition 1 we introduce some notation and deﬁn et h ec o r ei n
our model. Let I denote the set of agents who are directly or indirectly (i.e., through a partner)
involved in a meeting. For example, I = {A,B,C,D} in the situation illustrated in Figure 3.
Within the context of a meeting, an allocation is a collection of partnerships. For example, there
are two possible allocations for the meeting in Figure 3: h(A,B),(C,D)i and h(B,C),(A,D)i.
The ﬁrst represents the case in which A remains matched to B while C remains matched to D.
The second corresponds to the case in which B and C form a new match while A and D become
u n m a t c h e d( o rb e c o m em a t c h e dt oe a c ho t h e rb u ti ns t a t e0).47 Let Aj denote the set of all
possible allocations in a meeting that concerns j agents. Then, A2 = {h(A,B)i,h(A),(B)i},
A3 = {h(A,B),(C)i,h(A),(B,C)i} and A4 = {h(A,B),(C,D)i,h(B,C),(A,D)i}.A na l l o c a -
tion a ∈ Aj together with a payoﬀ proﬁle Π ∈ Rj constitute an outcome [a,Π].F o re x a m p l e ,
[h(A),(B)i,(ΠA,ΠB)] with ΠA = ΠB = V0 is the outcome corresponding to a situation in
which two unmatched agents meet and no match is formed. For any given meeting, a non-
empty subset S ⊆ I is called a coalition.L e tv denote a function that assigns a real number
to each coalition S.T h en u m b e rv(S) is called the worth of coalition S. Since utility is fully
transferable, v (S) summarizes the utility possibility set of coalition S.I n t u i t i v e l y ,v (S) is the
total utility available to the coalition, which can then be distributed among the coalition mem-
bers in any way. An outcome [a,Π] is blocked by a coalition S if there exists a payoﬀ proﬁle ˜ Π
with
P
i∈S ˜ Πi ≤ v (S) such that ˜ Πi > Πi for all i ∈ S. With transferable utility, an outcome
[a,Π] is blocked by S iﬀ
P
i∈S Πi <v (S).A n o u t c o m e [a,Π] that is feasible for the grand
coalition (i.e., such that
P
i∈I Πi ≤ v (I))i si nt h ecore if there is no coalition S that blocks
this outcome. With transferable utility, an outcome [a,Π] is in the core iﬀ
P
i∈S Πi ≥ v(S) for
47We ignore other feasible allocations such as h(A,C),(B,D)i,w h i c hw o u l dc o r r e s p o n dt o“ b r e a ku pb o t h
matches without forming a new one” because they will play no role in the analysis that follows.
49all S ⊆ I and
P
i∈I Πi ≤ v (I).48
P r o o fo fp a r t(c) of Proposition 1. The proof proceeds in three steps.
(Step 1). First consider the case illustrated in Figure 1, where an unemployed worker A and
an unmatched employer B meet and have the opportunity to form a match of productivity yk >
0.F o rt h i sc a s ew eh a v eI = {A,B}, and the list of all possible coalitions is {A,B}, {A}, {B}.
The worth of the grand coalition is v (I)=m a x( 2 V0,2Vk)=2 Vk,w h i l ev({A})=v ({B})=V0.
Av e c t o ro fp a y o ﬀs (ΠA,ΠB) lies in the core if and only if (i) ΠA +ΠB =2 Vk;a n d(ii) Πj ≥ V0
for j = A,B. We refer to the subgame that starts with A making a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
B as “subgame 1.” Figure 8 shows the core: it is the segment on the ΠA + ΠB =2 Vk line that
lies between the equilibrium payoﬀs of subgames 1 and 2 of the bilateral bargaining procedure.
Both equilibrium payoﬀsa sw e l la st h ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ lie in the core.
(Step 2). Next consider the case illustrated in Figure 2: agent B, who is currently in a
m a t c ho fp r o d u c t i v i t yyi with agent A, meets unmatched agent C and they draw a productive
opportunity yk.H e r eI = {A,B,C} and the list of all possible coalitions is {A,B,C}, {A,B},
{A,C}, {B,C}, {A}, {B}, {C}. The corresponding values are v(I)=m a x( 2 Vi + V0,2Vk + V0),
v({A,B})=2 Vi, v ({A,C})=2 V0, v ({B,C})=2 Vk, v ({A})=v({B})=v({C})=V0.
Hence, a payoﬀ proﬁle Π =( ΠA,ΠB,ΠC) belongs to the core if and only if: (i) ΠA+ΠB+ΠC =
max(2Vi + V0,2Vk + V0); (ii) ΠA + ΠB ≥ 2Vi; (iii) ΠB + ΠC ≥ 2Vk;a n d(iv) Πj ≥ V0 for
j = A,B,C.I fVk >V i, the four conditions can be rewritten as: (1) ΠA = V0; (2) ΠB ≥ 2Vi−V0;
(3) ΠB + ΠC =2 Vk;a n d(4) ΠC ≥ V0.T h eﬁrst panel of Figure 9 illustrates the core for this
case; it consists of all the payoﬀs (V0,ΠB,ΠC) such that (ΠB,ΠC) lie on the segment of the
ΠB + ΠC =2 Vk line between the equilibrium payoﬀs of subgames 1 and 2 of the bilateral
bargaining procedure (subgame 1 is the one that obtains when B makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer to C, while subgame 2 is the one where C makes the oﬀer to B). From the ﬁgure it is clear
48Notice that in our random matching environment, the core is deﬁn e dw i t hr e s p e c tt oI,t h es e to fa g e n t s
who are involved in a meeting. (Since there is no central meeting place, the notion of a grand coalition of all the
agents in the economy is meaningless here.)
50that the equilibrium payoﬀso fb o t hs u b g a m e sa n dt h ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ all belong to the core.
Conversely, if Vk <V i, then the four conditions reduce to: (1’) ΠA ≥ V0; (2’) ΠB ≥ 2Vk − V0;
(3’) ΠA + ΠB =2 Vi;a n d(4’) ΠC = V0. The second panel of Figure 9 illustrates the core for
this case; it consists of all the payoﬀs (ΠA,ΠB,V 0) such that (ΠA,ΠB) lie on the segment of
the ΠA + ΠB =2 Vi line between the equilibrium payoﬀs of subgames 1 and 2 of the bilateral
bargaining procedure (here subgame 1 is the one that obtains when B makes a take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀer to A, while subgame 2 is the one where A makes the oﬀer to B). From the ﬁgure it is
again clear that the equilibrium payoﬀso fb o t hs u b g a m e sa n dt h ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ all belong
to the core.
(Step 3). Finally, consider the case illustrated in Figure 3: while A and B are in a match
of productivity yi and C and D a r ei nam a t c ho fp r o d u c t i v i t yyj,a g e n t sB and C meet
and draw a productive opportunity yk.H e r e I = {A,B,C,D} and the list of all possi-
ble coalitions is: {A,B,C,D}, {A,B,C}, {A,B,D}, {B,C,D}, {A,C,D}, {A,B}, {C,D},
{A,C}, {B,D}, {B,C}, {A,D}, {A}, {B}, {C}, {D}. The corresponding values are v(I)=
max(2Vk +2 V0,2Vi +2 Vj), v({A,B,C})=m a x ( 2 Vi + V0,2Vk + V0), v ({A,B,D})=2 Vi +
V0, v({B,C,D})=m a x ( 2 Vj + V0,2Vk + V0), v ({A,C,D})=2 Vj + V0, v({A,B})=2 Vi,
v({C,D})=2 Vj, v ({A,C})=v{{B,D}} = v {{A,D}} =2 V0, v ({A})=v({B})=
v({C})=v({D})=V0.A p a y o ﬀ proﬁle Π =( ΠA,ΠB,ΠC,ΠD) is in the core if and only
if it satisﬁes the following inequalities: ΠA + ΠB + ΠC + ΠD =m a x ( 2 Vk +2 V0,2Vi +2 Vj),
ΠA + ΠB + ΠC ≥ max(2Vi + V0,2Vk + V0), ΠB + ΠC + ΠD ≥ max(2Vj + V0,2Vk + V0), ΠA +
ΠB+ΠD ≥ 2Vi+V0, ΠA+ΠC+ΠD ≥ 2Vj+V0, ΠA+ΠB ≥ 2Vi, ΠC+ΠD ≥ 2Vj, ΠB+ΠC ≥ 2Vk,
ΠA+ΠC ≥ 2V0, ΠB +ΠD ≥ 2V0, ΠA+ΠD ≥ 2V0, Πj ≥ V0 for j = A,B,C,D. It is straightfor-
ward to verify that the equilibrium and expected payoﬀs of the bilateral bargaining procedure
satisfy these ﬁfteen inequalities.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .First consider the case of a continuing match when neither partner
has an outside production opportunity. Every instant, with probability a half, the draw by
51Nature gives the bargaining power to the worker, who oﬀers the employer J0 (and keeps Mi−J0).
With the same probability Nature gives the bargaining power to the employer, who oﬀers
the worker V0 + Si (and keeps Mi − V0 − Si). As a result, utility is continuously divided
among the partners in such a way so that the worker’s expected continuation payoﬀ is Vi =
V0 + 1
2 (Mi − M0 + Si),a n dt h ee m p l o y e r ’ si sJi = J0 + 1
2 (Mi − M0 − Si). Next, we consider
each of the bargaining situations listed in the statement of the proposition.
(a).A nu n m a t c h e de m p l o y e ra n da nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e rd r a wan e wo p p o r t u n i t yyk.
With probability a half the worker has bargaining power, oﬀers J0, and the employer accepts.
With the same probability the employer oﬀers the worker V0, and the worker accepts. The new
m a t c hi sf o r m e dr e g a r d l e s so fw h om a k e st h eo ﬀer and the expected payoﬀsa r eV0+1
2 (Mk − M0)
for the worker and J0 + 1
2 (Mk − M0) for the employer. The individual expected capital gains
to the worker and the employer each equal 1
2 (Mk − M0).
(b).A nu n m a t c h e de m p l o y e ra n da ne m p l o y e dw o r k e rd r a wan e wo p p o r t u n i t y .
Suppose that worker B, who is currently employed in a match of quality i with employer
A, draws a new productive opportunity yk with an unmatched employer, C. We consider three
cases.
Case 1: Mi <M k. With probability a half the worker, B, has bargaining power. In this
case he chooses to oﬀer the new employer, C, Xk
BC = J0, and she accepts. Thus, B is able to
appropriate Mk − J0, the whole surplus from the new match. With probability another half,
the employers A and C have bargaining power. In this case B again chooses to bargain with
C ﬁrst, who oﬀers him Xk
CB = Mi − J0, which is the maximum payoﬀ A is willing to oﬀer
B,s oB accepts C’s oﬀer. Regardless of whether the worker or the employers have bargaining
power, the payoﬀst oB and C from forming a new match are larger than or equal to what they
would obtain if A and B were to stay matched, and therefore the equilibrium outcome is that
B and C form the new match. The expected payoﬀsa r eΠA = J0, ΠB = 1
2 (Mk + Mi) − J0,
and ΠC = J0 + 1
2 (Mk − Mi). The expected capital gains are ΓA = −1
2 (Mi − M0 − Si), ΓB =
1
2 (Mk − M0 − Si),a n dΓC = 1
2 (Mk − Mi).
52Case 2: M0 + Si <M k <M i. With probability a half the worker, B, has bargaining
power. In this case B oﬀers his old employer, A, Xi
BA = J0, and she accepts. With the same
probability, the employers, A and C, have bargaining power. In this case, B also chooses to
bargain with A ﬁrst, who makes B an oﬀer Xi
AB = Mk − J0,t h em a x i m u mC can oﬀer, and
B accepts to stay matched with A. Regardless of whether the worker or the employers have
bargaining power, the equilibrium outcome will be that B chooses to stay matched with A.
The equilibrium expected payoﬀsa r eΠA = J0 + 1
2 (Mi − Mk), ΠB = 1
2 (Mi + Mk) − J0,a n d
ΠC = J0. The expected gains are ΓB = −ΓA = 1
2 (Mk − M0 − Si) and ΓC =0 .
Case 3: Mk <M 0 + Si. With probability a half the worker, B, has bargaining power, he
oﬀers AX i
BA = J0, and they stay matched. With probability a half, the employers (A and C)
have bargaining power, and B chooses to bargain with A ﬁrst. The fact that Mk <M 0 + Si
means that A only needs to oﬀer B payoﬀ Xi
AB = V0 + Si to convince him to stay in the
match. Thus, regardless of whether the worker or the employers have bargaining power, B
stays matched to A. The equilibrium expected payoﬀsa r eΠA = Ji, ΠB = Vi,a n dΠC = J0,
and the expected gains are ΓA = ΓB = ΓC =0 .
(c). A matched employer and an unemployed worker draw a new opportunity.
Suppose that employer B, who is currently in a match of quality i with worker A,d r a w sa
new production opportunity yk with an unemployed worker C. In order for B and C to form
the new match, they have to pay Ti to the government. Thus the total value of the new match
to the agents in the bargaining (A, B,a n dC)i sM0
k ≡ Mk − Ti instead of Mk.B yt h es a m e
reasoning used in (b) above, and replacing Mk with M0
k, we obtain the following expected gains
from trade:
Case 1: Mi <M 0
k. ΓA = −1
2 (Mi − M0 − Si), ΓB = 1
2 (M0
k − M0 − Si) and ΓC = 1
2 (M0
k − Mi).
Case 2: M0 + Si <M 0
k <M i. ΓB = −ΓA = 1
2 (M0
k − M0 − Si) and ΓC =0 .
Case 3: M0
k <M 0 + Si. ΓA = ΓB = ΓC =0 .
(d). A matched employer and an employed worker draw a new opportunity.
Suppose that employer B and worker C meet and draw a productive opportunity yk.T h e
53situation now is that B is currently in a match of productivity yi with worker A,w h i l eC is
currently in a match of productivity yj with employer D. We divide the analysis into four cases
and assume, without loss of generality, that Mi + Sj ≤ Mj + Si.
Case 1: Mi + Mj − M0 <M k − Ti ≡ M0
k. Because the sum of the values of the new match
(net of taxes) and the unmatched exceeds the sum of the values of the existing matches, the
agent who does not have bargaining power chooses to bargain with the new partner ﬁrst. With
probability a half the employers (B and D) have bargaining power. In this case, B and C
negotiate ﬁrst, and B oﬀers him Xk
BC.T od e t e r m i n eh e ro ﬀer, B must take into account that C
c a nt h e ng oo nt ob a r g a i nw i t hD holding Xk
BC as his outside option. Employer D will be able
to outbid B’s oﬀer as long as Mj − Xk
BC >J 0.T h u s ,B can ensure that C will want to match
with her by oﬀering Xk
BC = Mj −J0. A similar reasoning implies that with probability another
half, when the workers A and C have bargaining power, B and C bargain ﬁrst, and C will oﬀer
Xk
CB = Mi − V0 − Si to B. In both situations, when the employers have bargaining power and
when the workers have bargaining power, B and C are better oﬀ by leaving their partners and
matching with each other. The expected payoﬀsa r eΠA = V0+Si, ΠB = Ji+ 1
2 (M0
k − Mj − Si),
ΠC = Vj + 1
2 (M0
k − Mi − Sj),a n dΠD = J0. The expected gains are ΓA = −1
2 (Mi − M0 − Si),
ΓB = 1
2 (M0
k − Mj − Si), ΓC = 1
2 (M0
k − Mi − Sj),a n dΓD = −1
2 (Mj − M0 − Sj).
Case 2: Mj + Si <M 0
k <M i + Mj − M0. Since the sum of the values of the existing
matches exceeds the sum of the values of the new match (net of taxes) and the unmatched, the
agent without bargaining power chooses to bargain with the old partner ﬁrst. With probability
a half, the workers (A and C) have bargaining power. Then B chooses to ﬁrst bargain with
A. When choosing his oﬀer Xi
AB,w o r k e rA takes into account the fact that B can continue
to bargain with the new worker, C,h o l d i n gXi
AB as her outside option. A knows that C will
outbid Xi




AB − Si is higher than C’s payoﬀ from staying matched with D, namely Mj − J0.S o
in order for A to win B over C, A needs to oﬀer B ap a y o ﬀ Xi
AB = M0
k − Mj + J0 − Si.
This leaves A with payoﬀ Mi − (M0
k − Mj + J0 − Si) >V 0 + Si,s oA and B stay matched.
54Worker C also stays matched to his old employer, D, and since he has bargaining power, B
captures the whole surplus of that match (Mj − J0) for himself. Similar arguments imply that
when, with probability another half, employers B and D have bargaining power, C chooses
to bargain with D ﬁrst, D oﬀers CX
j
DC = M0
k − Mi + V0,a n dC accepts to stay matched
to D.A l s o , B stays matched to A and captures the whole surplus, Mi − V0 − Si.I n e v e r y
case the equilibrium outcome is that B and C each decide to stay in the current match. The
equilibrium expected payoﬀsa r eΠA = Vi − 1
2 (M0
k − Mj − Si), ΠB = Ji + 1
2 (M0
k − Mj − Si),
ΠC = Vj + 1
2 (M0
k − Mi − Sj),a n dΠD = Jj − 1
2 (M0
k − Mi − Sj). The corresponding capital
gains are ΓB = −ΓA = 1
2 (M0
k − Mj − Si),a n dΓC = −ΓD = 1
2 (M0
k − Mi − Sj).
Case 3: Mi+Sj <M 0
k <M j +Si. As in the previous case, if the employers (B and D)h a v e




(As in the previous case, this is the minimum oﬀer that guarantees that D will not be outbid by
B.) In the event that the workers (A and C) have bargaining power, B chooses to bargain with
A ﬁrst. But in this case, A only needs to oﬀer B payoﬀ Xi
AB = J0 to convince her to stay in
t h em a t c h .( T h er e a s o ni st h a ti fB were to continue to bargain with C,t h em o s tt h a tC would
b ew i l l i n gt oo ﬀer B in order to form a new match is M0
k − Mj + J0 − Si <J 0; therefore when
making his oﬀer, A can eﬀectively ignore the fact that B has the option to continue to bargain
with C.) Again, the equilibrium outcome is that B and C stay with their current partners,
but this time C is able to extract a side payment from D while B gets no side payment from
A. The equilibrium expected payoﬀsa r eΠA = Vi, ΠB = Ji, ΠC = Vj + 1
2 (M0
k − Mi − Sj),
and ΠD = Jj − 1
2 (M0
k − Mi − Sj). The capital gains are ΓA = ΓB =0 ,a n dΓC = −ΓD =
1
2 (M0
k − Mi − Sj).
Case 4: M0
k <M i +Sj. Using a reasoning similar to the one we used above, in this case the
productivity of the new match is so low relative to the current matches, that the option to form
a new match allows neither B nor C to extract side-payments from their current partners. The
outcome is that B and C stay matched to their old partners, the equilibrium expected payoﬀs
are ΠA = Vi, ΠB = Ji, ΠC = Vj,a n dΠD = Jj, and the expected gains are nil to all.
55P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .T h ev a l u e so fa nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e ra n da nu n m a t c h e de m p l o y e rs o l v e






























Adding these expressions and using Proposition 3 leads to (14). A worker employed in a match
of type i earns wage wi and his expected payoﬀ satisﬁes






























































Similarly, the value of an employer in a match of productivity yi is:






























































Adding the last two expressions and using Proposition 3 lead to (13).
56P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .T h ev a l u e so fa nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e ra n da nu n m a t c h e de m p l o y e rs o l v e






























Aw o r k e re m p l o y e di nam a t c ho ft y p ei earns wage wi and his expected payoﬀ satisﬁes






























































Similarly, the value of an employer in a match of productivity yi is:






























































The expressions in the statement of the lemma result from using Proposition 3, and adding
(36) to (37), and (34) to (35).
57Free entry with constant returns meeting technology.
Suppose the aggregate meeting technology is given by a function ξ (m,n), which is monotonic
in both arguments and homogeneous of degree one. Since n =1 , in this alternative formulation
an employer contacts a random worker at rate α(m) ≡ ξ (1,1/m) and a worker contacts a
random employer at rate mα(m). So the probability an employer meets a worker who is
employed in a match of type i is α(m)ni, and the probability a worker meets an employer who
is in a match of type i is α(m)mj. Therefore, if we replace α with α(m), the Hamiltonian,
the ﬂow equations (15) and (16), and the optimality conditions for τk
ij are all unchanged, while






















ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj). (38)
The Euler equations associated with ni for i =1 ,...,n are as in Section 5 (again, after
replacing α with α(m)), but since α(m)=α(1 − n0 + m0), the one associated with n0 is now


























ij (λk + λ0 − λi − λj).
Using (38), which holds as long as m0 > 0, and collecting terms, this last condition becomes












j0)(λk − λj). (39)
Summarizing, the optimality conditions for the economy with a constant returns meeting tech-
nology are (3) and (38), together with (18) and (19), but with α = α(m). Comparing these
58optimal conditions with the conditions for the competitive matching equilibrium: (15), (16),
(20), (21), and (22)–which remain unchanged–we learn that the constant-returns-to-scale ag-
gregate matching function fails to solve the ineﬃciency associated with the search externality.
(See footnote 14.)
Lemma 3 A unique steady state distribution of workers exists for any given φ ∈ [0,1].T h e
number of unemployed workers, n0, solves
£
αn2





2δ(1 − n0) − α(1 + π)n2
0
¤2 =0 .
The number of workers employed in matches with productivity y1 is n1 =
2δ(1−n0)−α(1+π)n2
0
δ+2απn0 ,a n d
the number of workers employed in matches with productivity y2 is n2 =1− n0 − n1.
Proof of Lemma 3. Combining the ˙ n2 =0and ˙ n0 =0conditions, we ﬁnd that n1 = f (n0),
where f (n0) ≡
2δ(1−n0)−α(1+π)n2
0
δ+2απn0 .I tc a nb es h o w nt h a tf0 (n0) < 0 on [0,1],s ot oe a c hn0 ∈ [0,1]




α(1+π) and η0 =
√
(δ+απ)2+αδ(1+π)−(δ+απ)
α(1+π) ,w i t h0 <η 0 < η0 < 1.S u b s t i t u t i n g
n1 = f (n0) back into the ˙ n0 =0condition delivers a single equation in n0 which can be written









2δ(1 − n0) − α(1 + π)n2
0
¤2 .
Direct calculations reveal that G(η0;φ)=αη2
0 − δ(1 − η0) > 0 for all φ ∈ [0,1], and also that
G(η0;φ,ψ) has the same sign as αη0
2 − δ(1 − η0) − απφ. Note that an increase in φ causes
G to shift down uniformly, so to ensure G(η0;φ) < 0 for all φ,i ts u ﬃces to guarantee that
G(η0;0)< 0. This condition can be written as αη0
2 − δ(1 − η0) < 0, a parametric restriction






w h i c ht o g e t h e rw i t ht h ef a c tt h a tf0 (n0) < 0 implies that the steady state is unique.

































Proof of Lemma 4. Each match is subject to three independent Poisson processes: one with
arrival rate δ (the exogenous destruction process), and two with arrival rate α (the process
according to which the employer meets other workers and the one according to which the
worker meets other employers). Conditional on the arrival of one of these Poisson events, the



























1 − m0 − πψn1 (1 − π)m0 π(m0 + ψn1)




Then, given the number of arrivals over a period of length t follows a Poisson distribution with
parameter at, (40) follows. See Cox and Miller (1965) for more details.
60References
[1] Albæk, Karsten, and Bent E. Sørensen. “Worker Flows and Job Flows in Danish Manu-
facturing, 1980—91.” Economic Journal 105(451) (November 1998): 1750—1771.
[2] Anderson, Patricia, and Bruce D. Meyer. “The Extent and Consequences of Job Turnover.”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 1994: 177—248.
[3] Bertola, Giuseppe, and Richard Rogerson. “Institutions and Labor Reallocation.” European
Economic Review 41 (1997): 1147—1171.
[4] Blanchard, Olivier, and Pedro Portugal. “What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate:
Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets.” American Economic Review 91(1)
(March 2001): 187—207.
[5] Blau, David M., and Philip K. Robins. “Job Search Outcomes for the Employed and
Unemployed.” Journal of Political Economy 98(3) (1990): 637—654.
[6] Bontemps, Christian, Jean-Marc Robin, and Gerard J. van den Berg. “An Empirical Equi-
librium Job Search Model with Search On-the-Job and Heterogeneous Workers and Firms.”
International Economic Review 40(4) (November 1999): 1039—1074.
[7] Bontemps, Christian, Jean-Marc Robin, and Gerard J. van den Berg. “Equilibrium Search
with Continuous Productivity Dispersion: Theory and Nonparametric Estimation.” Inter-
national Economic Review 41(2) (May 2000): 305—358.
[8] Burdett, Kenneth. “A Theory of Employee Job Search and Quit Rates.” American Eco-
nomic Review 68(1) (March 1978): 212—220.
[9] Burdett, Kenneth, and Melvyn Coles. “Marriage and Class.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 112(1) (February 1997): 141—168.
61[10] Burdett, Kenneth, and Melvyn Coles. “Equilibrium Wage Tenure Contracts.” Economet-
rica 71(5) (September 2003): 1377—1404.
[11] Burdett, Kenneth, Ryoichi Imai, and Randall Wright. “Unstable Relationships.” Frontiers
of Macroeconomics: Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 1, 2004.
[12] Burdett, Kenneth, Ricardo Lagos, and Randall Wright. “An On-the-Job Search Model
of Unemployment, Inequality, and Crime.” International Economic Review 45(3) (August
2004): 681—706.
[13] Burdett, Kenneth, and Dale T. Mortensen. “Wage Diﬀerentials, Employer Size and Unem-
ployment.” International Economic Review 39 (1998): 257—273.
[14] Burgess, Simon, Julia Lane, and David Stevens. “Job Flows, Worker Flows, and Churning.”
Journal of Labor Economics 18(3) (July 2000): 473—502.
[15] Coles, Melvyn. “Equilibrium Wage Dispersion, Firm Size, and Growth.” Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics 4(1) (January 2001): 159—187.
[16] Cornelius, Tracy. “A Search Model of Marriage and Divorce.” Review of Economic Dy-
namics 6(1) (January 2003): 135—155.
[17] Cox, D. R., and H. D. Miller. The Theory of Stochastic Processes. London: Chapman and
Hall, 1965.
[18] Davis, Steven J., and John Haltiwanger. “Gross Job Creation, Gross Job Destruction,
and Employment Reallocation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3) (August 1992):
819—863.
[19] Davis, Steven J., and John Haltiwanger. “Measuring Gross Worker and Job Flows.” In
Labor Statistics Measurement Issues, edited by John Haltiwanger, Marilyn Manser and
Robert Topel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, 77—122.
62[20] Davis, Steven J., John Haltiwanger and Scott Schuh. Job Creation and Destruction.C a m -
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.
[21] Dey, Matthew S., and Christopher J. Flinn. “An Equilibrium Model of Health Insurance
Provision and Wage Determination.” Econometrica 73(2) (March 2005): 571—627.
[22] Diamond, Peter A. “Wage Determination and Eﬃciency in Search Equilibrium,” Review
of Economic Studies 49(2) (April 1982a): 217—227.
[23] Diamond, Peter A. “Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium.” Journal of
Political Economy 90(5) (October 1982b): 881—894.
[24] Diamond, Peter A., and Eric S. Maskin. “An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of
Contract I: Steady States.” Bell Journal of Economics 10(1) (September 1979): 282—316.
[25] Diamond, Peter A., and Eric S. Maskin. “Externalities and Eﬃciency in a Model of Sto-
chastic Job Matching.” MIT mimeo, November 1981.
[26] Fallick, Bruce C., and Charles A. Fleischman. “The Importance of Employer-to-Employer
Flows in the U.S. Labor Market,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001—18, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2001.
[27] Felli, Leonardo, and Kevin Roberts. “Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?”
STICERD Theoretical Economics Discussion Paper TE/01/414, London School of Eco-
nomics, 2001.
[28] Hamermesh, Daniel S., Wolter H. J. Hassink and Jan C. van Ours. “Job Turnover and
Labor Turnover: A Taxonomy of Employment Dynamics.” Annales D’Économie et de
Statistique 41/42 (1996): 21—40.
[ 2 9 ]J a c o b s o n ,L o u i sS . ,R o b e r tJ .L a L o n d e ,a n dD a n i e lG .S u l l i v a n .“ E a r n i n g sL o s s e so fD i s -
placed Workers.” American Economic Review 83(4) (September 1993): 685—709.
63[30] Jovanovic, Boyan. “Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 87(5) pt. 1 (October 1979): 972—990.
[31] Lazear, Edward, P. “Job Security Provisions and Employment.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 105(3) (August 1990): 699—726.
[32] Lippman, Steven A., and John, J. McCall. “The Economics of Search: A Survey. Part I.”
Economic Inquiry 14 (June 1976): 155—189.
[33] Ljungqvist, Lars, and Thomas J. Sargent. “The European Unemployment Dilemma,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 106(3) (June 1998): 514—550.
[34] Manning, Alan. Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.
[35] Millard, Stephen P., and Dale T. Mortensen. “The Unemployment and Welfare Eﬀects of
Labour Market Policy: A Comparison of the U.S. and U.K.” In Unemployment Policy:
How Should Governments Respond to Unemployment? edited by Dennis J. Snower and
Guillermo de la Dehesa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[36] Mortensen, Dale T. “Speciﬁc Capital and Labor Turnover.” Bell Journal of Economics
9(2) (Autumn 1978): 572—586.
[37] Mortensen, Dale T. “Property Rights and Eﬃciency in Mating, Racing, and Related
Games.” American Economic Review 72(5) (1982): 968—979.
[38] Mortensen, Dale T. “The Persistence and Indeterminacy of Unemployment in Search Equi-
librium.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 91(2) (1989): 347—370.
[39] Mortensen, Dale T. Wage Dispersion: Why Are Similar Workers Paid Diﬀerently? Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.
64[40] Mortensen, Dale T., and Christopher A. Pissarides. “Job Creation and Destruction in the
Theory of Unemployment.” Review of Economic Studies 61(3) (July 1994): 397—415.
[41] Mortensen, Dale T., and Christopher A. Pissarides. “Unemployment Responses to ‘Skill-
Biased’ Technology Shocks: The Role of Labour Market Policy.” Economic Journal 109
(April 1999): 242—265.
[42] Pissarides, Christopher A. “Eﬃcient Job Rejection.” Economic Journal 94 (Supplement
1984): 97—108.
[43] Pissarides, Christopher A. “Short-Run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment, Vacan-
cies, and Real Wages.” American Economic Review 75 (September 1985): 676—690.
[44] Pissarides, Christopher A. “Search Unemployment with On-the-job Search.” Review of
Economic Studies 61(3) (July 1994): 457—475.
[45] Pissarides, Christopher A. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2000 (second edition).
[46] Postel-Vinay, Fabien, and Jean-Marc Robin. “Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer
Heterogeneity.” Econometrica 70(6) (November 2002): 2295—2350.
[47] Pries, Michael, and Richard Rogerson. “Hiring Policies, Labor Market Institutions, and
Labor Market Flows.” Journal of Political Economy 113(4) (August 2005): 811—839.
[48] Shimer, Robert. “On-the-Job Search, Bargaining, and Wage Dispersion.” University of
Chicago mimeo, 2004.
[49] Shimer, Robert, and Lones Smith. “Assortative Matching and Search.” Econometrica 68(2)
(March 2000): 343—369.
[50] Shimer, Robert, and Lones Smith. “Nonstationary Search.” University of Chicago and
University of Michigan mimeo, 2001.
65[51] Van den Berg, Gerard J., and Geert Ridder. “An Empirical Equilibrium Search Model of
the Labor Market.” Econometrica 66(5) (September 1998): 1183—1221.
[52] Violante, Giovanni L. “Technological Acceleration, Skill Transferability, and the Rise in
Residual Inequality.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1) (February 2002): 297—338.
[53] Wolinski, Asher. “Matching, Search, and Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Theory 42
(1987): 311—333.
66Figure 8: Core payoﬀsf o ram e e t i n gi n v o l v i n gt w oa g e n t s .
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